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I. INTRODUCTION
Restrictions on the political activities of public employees
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wyoming.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
are commonplace and controversial.' Virtually all federal em-
ployees in the executive branch of government are so restricted
by the Hatch Act.2 Little Hatch Acts and a plethora of miscel-
laneous statutes, regulations, charter provisions, and ordinances
restrict the political activities of several million state and local
employees.3 However, the most significant source of restrictions
on state and local employees is not these state or local provi-
sions but the federal Hatch Act, which limits the political activ-
ity of over two and one-half million such employees who work
in programs that receive federal financial assistance." This ap-
1. There is a significant body of literature dealing with the gen-
eral subject of restrictions on political activities. See H. KAPLAN, THE
LAw OF CIVIL SERVICE 341-50 (1958); P. FORD, POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AND
PUBLIC SERVICE (Institute of Gov't Studies, Berkeley, Calif., Aug., 1963);
D. HAYMAN &. 0. STAHL, POLITICAL AcTnrTY RESTRICTIONS: AN ANALYSIS
wm RECOMMENDATIONS (Public Personnel Ass'n Personnel Report No.
636, 1963); Nelson, Public Employees and the Right to Engage in Politi-
cal Activity, 9 VANJ. L. REv. 27 (1955). A complete bibliography on
this subject is contained in 2 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON POLITICAL
AcTIvrrY OF GOVERNMENT PEaSONNELa 177-93 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
COMMISSION]. This was an advisory commission created by Congress
in 1966 (Act of Oct. 3, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-617, 80 Stat. 868). Its three
volume report contains a wealth of information on not only federal
but also state and foreign restrictions on political activity.
2. Technically the Hatch Act is the Act of Aug. 2, 1939, Pub. L.
No. 76-252, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 as amended and supplemented by the
Act of July 19, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-753, ch. 640, 54 Stat. 767. The Act
is codified as 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1508, 7324-7327 (1970) and 18 U.S.C.
§§ 594, 595, 598, 600, 601, 604, 605, 608, 609, 611 (1970). Although other
statutory restrictions limit the political activities of federal employees
(see 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-7323 (1970), 18 U.S.C. §§ 602, 606, 607 (1970)) sec-
tions 7324-7327 of title 5 are the most important. For a discussion of
the application of the noncriminal provisions to federal employees, see
Esman, The Hatch Act-A Reappraisal, 60 YALE L.J. 986 (1951); P. FoRD,
supra note 1, at 21-50; Friedman & Klinger, The Hatch Act: Regulation
by Administrative Action of Political Activities of Governmental Em-
ployees, 7 FED. B.J. 5 (1945); Howard, Federal Restrictions on the Politi-
cal Activity of Government Employees, 35 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 470(1941); Mosher, Government Employees under the Hatch Act, 22 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 233 (1947). In addition there are numerous comments on cases
construing the Hatch Act and analyzing its constitutionality. See, e.g.,
Note, 61 MICH-. L. REv. 592 (1963) and sources cited at notes 214, 221
infra.
3. R. CHRISTOPHERSON, REGULATING POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES (Civil Service Assembly Report No. 543, 1954); 2 CoMMIS-
SION, supra note 1, at 91-154; P. FORD, supra note 1, at 51-99; Comment,
Economic Institutions and Value Survey, 40 NOTRE DAME LAW. 606, 614-
28 (1965).
4. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1508 (1970). The two and one-half million
estimate is based upon statements made at recent Senate hearings that
the Hatch Act applies to five million public employees at all levels of
government. According to some of the testimony only two and one-half
million of the five million are federal employees. Thus the remaining
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plication of the Hatch Act is an exercise by Congress of its power
to attach conditions to the availability of federal funds. Al-
though the states have endured this imposition on their preroga-
tives because of their need for financial assistance, the Act has
had an abrasive effect on intergovernmental relations in our
federal system.5 Furthermore, the nature of the activities pro-
scribed and the number of persons affected by these and com-
parable restrictions have led courts, commissions and commen-
tators to criticize them as being at variance with the first amend-
ment guarantee of freedom of political expression and with this
country's commitment to participatory democracy.6
The original version of the Hatch Act, passed in 1939 and ap-
plicable only to federal employees, 7 was the culmination of sev-
eral years of agitation in Congress for legislation to end the
two and one-half million would be state and local. See Hearings on S.
3374 and S. 3417 Before the Senate Comm. on Post Office and Civil
Serv., 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 170, 199, 209, 228 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Hearings]. More recently an official of the Civil Service Com-
mission estimated that three to five million state, local and poverty
program employees were covered by the Hatch Act. Letter from L. Col-
lins, Office of General Counsel, United States Civil Serv. Comm'n to
the 'author, Dec. 11, 1972. Since there were only 10.4 million state
and local employees in 1971, and five and one-half million of these
worked in educational institutions (BuREAu oF CENsUS, DEP'T OF CoM-
AmRCE, PuBLIc EAV LOYTEiNT IN 1971 at 8 (1971)), and are thus not sub-
ject to the Act (see 5 U.S.C. § 1501(4) (B) (1970)), it appears that at
least 50% of non-educational state and local employees are covered by
the Act.
It might also be noted that there has been a significant increase in
the number of state and local employees subject to the Act over the
years. In 1940 an estimated 500,000 state and local employees were
covered. In 1967 the figure was one and one-half million. The increase
is related to the increased federal aid to state and local government,
which was $572 million in 1940, $17.5 billion in 1967, $35 billion in
1972, and is projected to be at least $60 billion by 1980. See Senate
Hearings 199; 1 CommissIoN, supra note 1, at 24 n.2.
For earlier discussions of the Hatch Act and its application to
state and local employees see Friedman & Klinger, The Hatch Act:
Regulation by Administrative Action of Political Activities of Govern-
mental Employees (Part 11), 7 FYm. B.J. 138 (1945) (Part I of this article,
cited supra note 2, deals primarily with the law as it affects federal em-
ployees); Comment, supra note 3, at 608-14. See also Annot., 8 A.L.RL
Fed. 343 (1971).
5. See note 247 infra and accompanying text. Cf. Welsh, The
Hatch Act and the States, 37 STATE GOV'T 8 (1964).
6. See, e.g., Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1971). In
Hobbs and nine other recent cases restrictions have been declared un-
constitutional. See cases cited in notes 214, 220 infra. See also T.
EMERsoN, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDoM OF EXPRESSION 582-92 (1970); P. FoRD,
supra note 1, at 5-9; Nelson, supra note 1; cf. 1 Commmsou, supra
note 1, at 16-17.
7. Act of Aug. 2, 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-252, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147.
19731
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"pernicious" political activities of public employees allegedly oc-
curring in connection with the emergency public relief programs
during the depression.8 In 1940, before Congressional concern
had abated and at President Roosevelt's request,9 the Hatch Act
was made applicable to almost all state and local employees
whose principal employment was in activities financed in whole
or in part with federal moneys. 10
In the thirty-three years since its passage, no change of sub-
stance has been made in the provisions of the Act as it relates to
state and local government." However, it is likely that federal
revenue sharing, by substantially increasing the number of em-
ployees restricted by the Act, will lead to an enlivened interest
in the subject.' 2 Moreover, it appears that the Supreme Court is
about to decide important questions concerning the constitution-
ality of the Act.13 Thus, it is again appropriate to undertake an
examination of the content, application, enforcement, constitu-
tionality, and desirability of these restrictions of the Hatch Act.
In addition, this Article will consider the federal standard for
state merit systems regarding political activity.' 4 This standard
simply incorporates by reference the Hatch Act restrictions and
thus requires states to both include and enforce these restrictions
as a part of the state merit system required for personnel work-
ing in designated federally assisted activities.
IL RESTRICTIONS
A. THE PRovisioNs
The most important restrictive provisions of the Hatch Act
relating to state and local employees are contained in 5 U.S.C.
§ 1502 (a), which provides:
8. 1 CoMMIssioN, supra note 1, at 9-10. For a different analysis
of the motives behind the Act see Mosher, supra note 2, at 234-37.
9. Message to the United States Senate, Aug. 2, 1939, in 8 TuE
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. RoosEvELr 410, 415 (1939).
It is of interest to note that President Roosevelt asked only that the
participation of state and local employees in federal elections be re-
stricted. The Act, as will be seen, goes much further.
10. Act of July 19, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-753, ch. 640, §§ 4, 12, 15,
17, 18, 19, 54 Stat. 767; codified as 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1508 (1970).
11. The number of attempts to repeal or amend the Hatch Act
as it applies to state and local employees is impressive. For a partial
list see H.R. REP. No. 2707, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 35-41 (1959).
12. See text accompanying note 149 infra.
13. See text accompanying notes 219-21 infra.
14. 45 C.F.R. § 70.6 (1972).
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A State or local officer or employee may not-
(1) use his official authority or influence for the purpose
of interfering with or affecting the result of an election or a
nomination for office;(2) directly or indirectly coerce, attempt to coerce, com-
mand, or advise a State or local officer or employee to pay, lend,
or contribute anything of value to a party, committee, organi-
zation, agency, or person for political purposes; or
(3) take an active part in political management or in po-
litical campaigns.
Another limitation is included in section 595 of title 18, which
prohibits the use of
official authority for the purpose of interfering with, or affect-
ing, the nomination or the election of any candidate for [elected
federal office] ....
With two minor exceptions these restrictions are identical to
the Hatch Act restrictions applicable to federal employees. 15
One difference is that the federal employee provisions do not
contain any clause expressly limiting solicitation. This discrep-
ancy is, however, explained and rendered unimportant by other
statutes covering solicitation and by the general language of the
counterpart to section 1502 (a) (3) which presumably proscribes
solicitation.' The other difference is the omission in the federal
employee counterpart of section 1502 (a) (1) of the words "or a
nomination."' 7 This difference is also unimportant since elec-
tions may be construed to include nominations and since, in any
event, the general language of the counterpart to section 1502
(a) (3) can again be used to prohibit the same activity.
Of these four restrictive clauses, section 1502 (a) (3) is the
critical one. The other three deal with blatant employment-re-
lated conduct-the abuse of official authority and the coercive
solicitation of other employees for the purpose of influencing
the political process. As will be seen below, section 1502(a) (3)
has been construed by the United States Civil Service Commis-
sion, the agency responsible for its enforcement,is as applicable
not only to job-connected conduct, but also to a multitude of other
employee activities regardless of when they occur or whom they
involve. The importance of the other three limitations is that
they are not subject to the exception for nonpartisan political ac-
15. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 1502(a) (1970) with 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)
(1970), its counterpart for federal employees. 18 U.S.C. § 595 applies
to both federal and designated state and local employees.
16. See 5 U.S.C. § 7323 (1970); 18 U.S.C. § 602 (1970); cf. 18 U.S.C.
§§ 606, 607 (1970), dealing with solicitations. The general language
similar to § 1502(a) (3) is found in 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a) (2) (1970).
17. 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a) (1) (1970).
18. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1504-1507 (1970).
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tivity' 9 and that they alone apply to certain state and local offi-
cials excepted from coverage of section 1502 (a) (3).20 In addi-
tion, section 595 carries criminal penalties and is therefore en-
forced by the Justice Department, not the United States Civil
Service Commission.
It should also be noted that these provisions do not apply to
all state and local employees, but only to those working in con-
nection with federally funded activities."u They are also inap-
plicable to state and local employees working for educational or
research institutions.22 Finally, substantive exceptions exist for
conduct related to nonpartisan activity and to certain referen-
dums. 23 Both the application question and the exceptions will
be discussed below.24
B. THE DEFINITIONAL PROBLEM
Perhaps the most conspicuous feature of section 1502 (a) (3)
is its ambiguity. What specific acts are included in the proscrip-
tion against taking "an active part in political management or in
political campaigns"? In a misguided attempt to give it meaning,
Congress defined the phrase in section 1501(5) as those acts of
political management and campaigning prohibited by the deci-
sions of the United States Civil Service Commission prior to July
19, 1940.25 Since there are over 3,000 such decisions, the only
copies of which are in the offices of the Commission,2 0 only an
archivist could make such a definition meaningful. To clarify
this situation, the Commission has published pamphlets and pos-
ters indicating permitted and prohibited activities.2 7  However,
19. 5 U.S.C. § 1503 (1970). See text accompanying notes 78-92
inIra.
20. See 5 U.S.C. § 1502(c) (1970) discussed in text accompanying
notes 153-56 infra. The first two provisions of § 1502(a) are also dis-
cussed at that point.
21. 5 U.S.C. § 1501(4) (1970).
22. Id. § 1501 (4) (B).
23. Id. § 1503.
24. See text accompanying notes 78-92 infra discussing nonparti-
san activity and referred questions and Section III infra discussing ap-
plication of the Act.
25. 5 U.S.C. § 1501(5) (1970). For a trenchant criticism of this
provision, see Rose, A Critical Look at the Hatch Act, 75 HARv. L. REV.
510 (1962).
26. See J. IRwIN, HATCH ACT DECISIONs 40 (1949).
27. See, e.g., UNITED STATES CIVIL SEr. COMM'N, STATE AND LOCAL
EMPLOYEES POLITICAL PARTICIPATION (G.C. 39, 1972) [hereinafter cited
as STATE EMPLOYEE PAMPHLET]; Poster headed "State and Local Employ-
ees Who Work in Federally Aided Programs Know the Rules on Politi-
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because of their unofficial nature and ambiguities, these publi-
cations fail to adequately solve the definitional problem.
In the last three years the Civil Service Commission has
taken two commendable steps to give meaning to the congres-
sional definition. In 1970 it promulgated regulations listing 12
permitted and 13 prohibited activites for state and local em-
ployees covered by the Hatch Act and containing some general
comments. 2 In 1971 it issued the Political Activity Reporter-a
three volume set of all of its decisions since 1940 with an index,
a digest and a promise of annual supplements. " Although help-
ful in resolving ambiguities and predicting the Commission's de-
cisions in particular cases, and a clear improvement over the pre-
vious combination of 3,000 obscure decisions and unofficial
pamphlets, the legal status of the regulations and the Po-
litical Activity Reporter is subject to question. There is no ap-
parent legal authority for these regulations regarding state and
local employees.3 0  Furthermore, the pre-1940 decisions of the
Commission still constitute the official definition, and they are
as obscure as ever. Whether the Commission would be able to
resort to a pre-1940 decision prohibiting activity allowed by the
regulations is an unanswered question.3' In the converse situa-
tion, if an individual were charged with violating the statute
by engaging in activity proscribed by the regulations but ap-
proved by an early decision, the decision would presumably pre-
vail. Although the post-1940 Commission decisions contained
cal Activity" (1968). Until recently the basic reference for information
on the Hatch Act was UN=TE STATES CIvIL SERv. COzmMN, PoLiTicAL
AcTvrry or FEDERAL OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES (Pamphlet 20, 1966)[hereinafter cited as PAxVmHLET 201.
28. 5 C.F.R. §§ 151.101-.123 (1972).
29. UN= STATES CivnL SERv. ComnIx, PoLIcAL AcTrvrry REPoRTER(1971) (hereinafter cited as PoL. AcT. RPmR.].
30. The authority cited for these regulations is 5 U.S.C. §§ 1302(d),
1501-1508 (1970). Sections 1501 to 1508 grant no rule making authority.
Although section 1302 (d) allows the Commission to "prescribe reasonable
procedure and regulations for the administration of its functions under
[§§ 1501-1508]", this was apparently long used as authority merely to
establish procedures. When the 1940 version of the Act was first be-
fore Congress, it included express rule making powers. However, this
power was deleted in a substitute version by Senator Hatch who re-
marked "it seemed to me to be very wise not to give the Commission
any more power to interpret further in the future." 86 CONG. Rsc. 2949
(1940). See Rose, supra note 25, at 512-13. Furthermore, the very lan-
guage of the statutory definition in section 1501(5) is inconsistent with
Commission power to define by regulation.
31. See 2 K. DAVIS, ADINSTRATIVE LAw §§ 17.01-.04 (1958). For in-
dication that estoppel would apply against the Commission, see Brandt
v. Hicke, 427 F.2d 53 (9th Cir. 1970).
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in the Political Activity Reporter are excellent indicators of the
Commission's current interpretation of the Hatch Act, these de-
cisions have no legal status comparable to the pre-1940 decisions.
The ambiguity of the language in section 1502(a) (3) as de-
fined in section 1501 (5) may even rise to the level of constitu-
tional infirmity. In a recent case, National Association of Letter
Carriers v. United States Civil Service Commission,32 a three
judge Federal District Court held an identical definition in that
portion of the Hatch Act dealing with federal employees uncon-
stitutional for vagueness and overbreadth. Although the opin-
ion expressly disclaimed any decision on the validity of section
1501(5), 33 the opinion is persuasive, and its application to the
provision affecting state and local employees is obvious. In any
case, the definitional problem is one that clearly requires con-
gressional clarification.
C. PARTICULAR AcTI s
Notwithstanding the ambiguities, the particular political ac-
tivities of state and local employees that are in practice permit-
ted and proscribed under the Hatch Act can be determined with
some certainty on the basis of other provisions of the Act, the
regulations, and Commission and court decisions. Moreover,
since virtually identical substantive restrictions regarding politi-
cal activity apply to federal employees,34 'decisions of the courts
and interpretive statements and decisions by the Commission
dealing with federal employees are directly relevant.3,
1. Voting
Although the scope of activities prohibited by the Hatch Act
is very broad, the Act does not include any proscriptions on the
exercise of the right to vote. Rather, the right to vote is guar-
anteed both by statute and by the regulations.3 6 Under the
regulations, freedom to sign petitions is also protected.3 7
32. 346 F. Supp. 578 (D.D.C. 1972), prob. juris. noted, 93 S. Ct. 560
(1972), invalidating 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a) (2) (1970). See section VI infra,
discussing the constitutionality of the Act.
33. 346 F. Supp. at 579 n.1.
34. See notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text.
35. Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127
(1947). See also PAMPHLET 20, supra note 27, at 18.
36. 5 U.S.C. § 1502(b) (1970); 5 C.F.R. § 151.111(a)(1) (1972).
Similarly, it has been indicated that use of federally financed housing fa-
cilities for a polling place would not violate the Hatch Act. Jones v.
Middlesex County Bd. of Elections, 258 F. Supp. 469 (D.N.J. 1966).
37. 5 C.F.R. § 151.111(a) (7) (1972).
[Vol. 57:493
POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
2. Individual Expression
The statute and regulations also recognize the right of the
state and local employee to express his opinion, publicly as well
as privately, on political subjects and candidates. 38 This in-
cludes varieties of symbolic expression such as the right to dis-
play bumper stickers, badges, buttons and pictures.3 9 At some
point, however, expression of opinion becomes an "active part
in political management or in political campaigns" and is thus
prohibited by section 1502 (a) (3) .40 The Civil Service Commis-
sion has taken the position that this occurs whenever the ex-
pression of opinion is related to campaign strategy or is ad-
dressed to a political group.41 A radio speech attacking a candi-
date,42 solicitation of votes, 43 participation in a political parade,
4 4
and endorsements in advertisements and campaign literature
4
"
are examples of expression that the Commission has held viola-
tive of the Hatch Act.4"
38. 5 U.S.C. § 1502(b) (1970); 5 C.F.R. § 151.l1l(a) (2) (1972). Prior
to the adoption of the Hatch Act, the regulations of the Civil Service
Commission recognized only the limited right of civil service employees
to "express privately their opinions." UNTrED STATES CIuL Srnv.
COmAMIN, TwEv=y-FouiTr Am'NrAL REPoRT 55 (1907). In the course of
congressional deliberations the word "privately" was deleted, an indi-
cation of congressional intent to accord a greater degree of freedom to
the affected employees. See remarks of Senator Hatch, 83 CoNG. REc.
7999-8000 (1938), 86 CONG. REC. 2870-71 (1940). The Civil Service Com-
mission has recognized this intent in their rules, as have the courts.
See Wilson v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 136 F. Supp. 104
(D.D.C. 1955).
39. 5 C.F.R. § 151.111(a) (3) (1972).
40. 5 U.S.C. § 1502(a) (3) (1970). For a probing analysis of this in-
herent ambiguity in the Hatch Act provisions, see Nelson, Political Ex-
pression under the Hatch Act and the Problem of Statutory Ambiguity,
2 MIDWEST J. POL. SCm 76 (1958). Professor Nelson breaks the ambigu-
ity into four areas: (1) Public expression on political matters, (2) dis-
tinguishing between partisan and nonpartisan topics, (3) expression that
influences other individuals, and (4) "unorganized" expression of opin-
ion. Illustrative of the problem is the fact that expression before
campaigns is less restricted than expression during campaigns. How-
ever, in view of the advance work done by presidential "candidates,"
it is hard to tell when campaigns begin. Id. at 81. See also Comment,
24 Gm. WAsE. L. REV. 239 (1955).
41. See 5 C.F.R. § 151.122(5), (7), (10), (12). See also SrAt Em-
PLOmE PAm =NT, supra note 27, at 3-4.
42. In re Anderson, 2 POL. AcT. RPTR. 356 (1950), rev'd on other
grounds, 119 F. Supp. 567 (D. Mont. 1954).
43. 5 C.F.R. § 151.122(7) (1972).
44. Pamphlet 20, supra note 27, at 15. See In. re Langley, 1 PoL.
AcT. RPTm 332 (1947).
45. 5 C.F.R. § 151.122(b) (10) (1972).
46. A related but slightly different problem is the employees' ex-
pression of opinion concerning some work related subject. Critical pub-
1973]
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The courts are perhaps more sensitive than the Commission
to the right of freedom of expression, and in two cases involving
federal employees, Commission findings of violations have been
reversed. In Gray v. Macy,47 a speech at a meeting of a county
political party on behalf of the candidacy of an American com-
munist leader was held protected. This appears to conflict with
a provision in the Commission regulations. 48 In Wilson v.
United States Civil Service Commission,49 it was decided that a
letter to the editor of a newspaper at election time criticizing a
candidate for governor was also protected. The Wilson court in-
dicated, however, that the right of expression is limited by the
prohibition against active participation in political campaigns.
Thus, if the letter had been a part of an organized effort, rather
than an individual action, the result would probably have been
different.
3. Party Activities
State and local employees subject to the Hatch Act may be
members of political parties and clubs and attend open meetings
of such organizations.5 " Virtually all other activity in connec-
tion with political parties and clubs is, however, proscribed.
Employees subject to the restrictions may not participate in or-
ganizing such parties and clubs; be officers at any level, includ-
ing the precinct; be a member of any committees thereof; be
delegates, alternates or proxies to any political convention; or
be a candidate for any such positions.' The Civil Service Com-
lic expressions of this nature by government employees have been
punished as insubordination, not prohibited political activity. Such crit-
icism can, however, have political overtones even though it is not
partisan, and thus it might fall within the literal language of the Hatch
Act. Under certain circumstances such expression is protected by the
first amendment. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
For a discussion of this area, see T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM
OF ExPREssIoN 567-81 (1970).
47. 358 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'g 239 F. Supp. 658 (D. Ore.
1965).
48. See 5 C.F.R. § 151.122(b) (12) (1972). Since the regulations were
not adopted until after the decision, the court could not have been
aware of the possibility of a conflict.
49. 136 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1955).
50. 5 C.F.R. § 151.111(a) (5), (6) (1972).
51. 5 C.F.R. § 151.122(b) (1), (2), (11) (1972). This interpretation
of the Hatch Act has been conceded or followed in numerous cases.
Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947)
(acting as chairman of party's state central committee and being mem-
ber of committee planning fund raising dinner for party); Palmer v.
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 297 F.2d 450 (7th Cir. 1962), cert.
[Vol. 57:493
POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
mission has taken the position that even work in unofficial ca-
pacifies including pedestrian volunteer work is prohibited, that
attendance at meetings is limited to general membership meet-
ings, that participation in meetings is limited to voting on candi-
dates and issues, and that addressing the meeting in connection
with any candidacy is proscribed. 52
This extremely restrictive interpretation of the Hatch Act
seems to be at variance with its wording. The Act merely pro-
hibits taking "an active part in political management or in po-
litical campaigns"5 3 and, as previously noted, it provides that an
employee subject to its restrictions "retains the right ... to ex-
press his opinions on political subjects and candidates."5' The
Gray case held that the right of expression included addressing
a meeting regarding a candidate and that trying to induce peo-
ple to assume party office was not sufficient to constitute taking
an "active" part. 5 Furthermore, the court expressed doubt
about whether the solicitation of votes for candidates for local
party office would constitute an "active" part. Whether other
courts will follow this restrained application of the Hatch Act to
party activities is uncertain. Although such moderation in ap-
plication would seem welcome, it could lead to significant am-
biguity as to what activities constitute "active" participation.
It should be noted that these restrictions only apply to par-
tisan political activities. Activities of a nonpartisan nature are
governed by different rules. 0 Work with community improve-
denied, 369 U.S. 849 (1962) (precinct committeeman and chairman of
the county party); Fishkin v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 309 F.
Supp. 40 (N.D. Cal. 1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 278 (1970) (director
of regional Young Democrats organization and candidate for county
party central committee); Engelhardt v. United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 197 F. Supp. 806 (MD. Ala. 1961), affd per curiam, 304
F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1962) (director of state Democratic Executive
Committee). Cases involving federal employees include: United Pub.
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (ward executive, committeeman,
poll-worker on election day, paymaster for services of other party work-
ers on election day); Osheim v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 299
F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Wis. 1969) (organizing and holding meeting to or-
ganize ward unit of political party, nominating persons for ward office,
holding ward offices and being alternate delegate to county convention).
52. STATE FavLOYEE PAmp.LET, supra note 27, at 3. It may be
that the Commission believes that this restrictive approach is required
by its pre-1940 decisions. See In re Arrington, 2 POL. ACT. Rrnt. 209,
211 (1944); In re Caddell, 2 POL. AcT. RPTR. 116, 117 (1943).
53. 5 U.S.C. § 1502(a) (3) (1970) (emphasis supplied).
54. Id. § 1502(b).
55. Gray v. Macy, 358 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1966).
56. See notes 78-89 infra and accompanying text.
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ment or fair election groups is not considered partisan. 7  Al-
though the statutes do not define with precision what consti-
tues a partisan organization, it is unlikely that lobbying groups
or public interest organizations such as the Sierra Club would
be considered partisan for Hatch Act purposes. The concern of
these groups is with political issues, not parties. Only when the
organization has a clear relationship to a recognized political
party is participation subject to restrictions. Thus, political
clubs and organizations which may not be the official party for
legal purposes but which serve as de facto units of or adjuncts
to political parties are partisan organizations for purposes of the
Hatch Act.-,
4. Political Contributions
The regulations approve financial contributions to political
parties and organizations. 9 However, all solicitation and 'direct
or indirect work in connection therewith are prohibited.00 For
example, the sale of tickets to political dinners and other fund
raising activities is proscribed.0t Any attempt to solicit another
employee is, of course, prohibited. Such solicitation can be
subtly coercive, especially when done by a superior.0 2 Thus, it
should be considered a violation of both the general prohibition
against playing an active role in political management or cam-
paigns and the explicit prohibition against solicitation.2
5. Supporting Candidates
Since state and local employees subject to the Hatch Act
57. 5 C.F.R. § 151.111 (a) (4) (1972). Cf. Dingess v. Hampton, 305 F.
Supp. 169 (D.D.C. 1969).
58. See Osheim v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 299 F. Supp.
317 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
59. 5 C.F.R. § 151.111 (a) (8) (1972). See Wages v. United States
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 170 F.2d 182 (6th Cir. 1948).
60. 5 C.F.R. § 151.122(b) (3) (1972). See Jarvis v. United States
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 382 F.2d 339 (6th Cir. 1967); Utah v. United States,
286 F.2d 30 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 918 (1961); Stewart v.
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 45 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. Ga. 1942).
61. 5 C.F.R. § 151.122(b) (4) (1972). See Utah v. United States, 280
F.2d 30 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 918 (1961). Cf. Jarvis v. United
States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 382 F.2d 339 (6th Cir. 1967).
62. See Jarvis v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 382 F.2d 339(6th Cir. 1967). The Commission has even gone so far as to suggest
that when an official allows solicitation of funds by subordinates for
his political activity, he may violate the Act. See In re Huiet, 2 POL.
ACT. RPT. 100 (1942).
63. 5 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (2) (1970). Cf. cases cited in note 60 supra.
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may not take an active part in any political campaign, 4 efforts
that are a part of a campaign such as circulating nominating pe-
titions, soliciting votes, distributing literature, and serving on
committees are all prohibited.65 Although signing nominating
petitions and displaying bumper stickers, badges, buttons and
pictures, 67 as well as expression of personal views regarding can-
didates are permitted, 68 there may, as discussed, be limits on
such expression if it is too closely identified with a campaign-60
6. Candidacy for Office
Candidacy for partisan public office at any level of govern-
ment is prohibited.7 0 Thus, announcing one's candidacy for an
office and arranging for advertising of candidacy constitute a
violation of the Hatch Act even though no campaigning is ac-
tually done.7 1 Election to office by a truly spontaneous write-in
effort is apparently not in violation of the Act.72  Seeking and
holding nonpartisan offices are permitted under the circum-
stances described below.
64. 5 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (3) (1970); 5 C.F.R. § 151.122(b) (5) (1972).
65. 5 C.F.R. § 151.122(b) (7), (12), (13) (1972). Cf. Wages v. United
States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 170 F.2d 182 (6th Cir. 1948) ("executive di-
rection of political campaigns... , speeches, distribution of literature,
house to house canvasses" at 183).
66. See note 37 supra.
67. See note 39 supra.
68. See text accompanying notes 38, 47-49 supra.
69. See text accompanying notes 40-49 supra.
70. 5 C.F.R. § 151.122(b) (6) (1970). See Northern Va. Reg. Park
Auth. v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 437 F.2d 1346 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 936 (1971) (candidate for and member of state legisla-
ture); In re Higginbotham, 340 F.2d 165 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
853 (1965) (candidate for alderman on partisan ticket); In re Ramshaw,
266 F. Supp. 73 (D. Idaho 1967) (candidate for sheriff); cf. Smyth v.
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 291 F. Supp. 568 (E.D. Wis. 1968)
(candidate for county clerk); Matturi v. United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 130 F. Supp. 15 (D.N.J. 1955), affd per curiam, 229 F.2d 435 (3d
Cir. 1956) (candidate for congress. If, however, an individual holds elec-
tive public office at the time he is appointed to a position covered by the
Hatch Act, he may complete his term in that office. He may also accept
appointment to a vacant elective office and apparently complete the
unexpired term while holding a position subject to the Hatch Act.
But in neither situation may the employee retain his position and run
for election or re-election. STATE EMPLOYEE PAMPHLET, supra note 27,
at 4.
71. Smyth v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 291 F. Supp. 568
(E.D. Wis. 1968). The Commission has also taken the position that ac-
tivities prior to formal declaration of candidacy are prohibited. See
PA pAmjH= 20, supra note 27, at 15.
72. PAMEmLr 20, supra note 27, at 15.
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7. Election Activities
As has been noted, the right to vote is recognized by the
Hatch Act. 7 3 Participating in get-out-the-vote efforts and func-
tioning in positions such as poll watchers or challengers are pro-
scribed activities if done on behalf of a party or candidate.7
Serving as an election judge or other official is permitted if it
involves only the performance of nonpartisan duties prescribed
by law. 75 Although at one time the Commission apparently took
the position that bipartisan or nonpartisan voter registration
and get-out-the-vote efforts were prohibited,76 it appears to have
reversed its stand on these matters. 77
8. Nonpartisan Political Activity
Exempted from the general prohibition of section 1502 (a) (3)
is political activity in connection with:
an election and the preceding campaign if none of the candidates
is to be nominated or elected at that election as representing a
party any of whose candidates for presidential elector received
votes in the last preceding election at which presidential electors
were selected .... 78
The Civil Service Commission has indicated that this provision
was intended to allow state and local employees otherwise sub-
ject to the Hatch Act either to be a candidate for or to play an
active role in the campaign of another for an office that state
law designates as nonpartisan. 79 In most states only local gov-
ernment officials such as school board and municipal council
73. See note 36 supra.
74. 5 C.F.R. § 151.122(b) (8), (9) (1972). Partisan voter registration
efforts are presumably also prohibited if done on behalf of a party.
75. 5 C.F.R. § 151.111 (a) (11) (1970). Even if such election officials
must be chosen from different parties and are recommended by the
party, their function is not thereby rendered partisan. See STATE EM-
PLOYEE PAMPHLET, supra note 27, at 4.
76. See 1 COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 21.
77. See Letter of Deputy General Counsel, United States Civil
Serv. Comm'n, set forth in Dingess v. Hampton, 305 F. Supp. 169, 171
(D.D.C. 1969). But see 42 U.S.C. § 2943(b) (1970), prohibiting identifi-
cation of OEO programs with get-out-the-vote or voter registration ef-
forts regardless of their nonpartisan nature.
78. 5 U.S.C. § 1503(1) (1970). The restrictions of § 1502(a) (1) and(2) do, however, apply to such elections. These restrictions are set
forth and discussed in text following note 14 and accompanying notes
18-20 supra.
79. See In re Broering, 1 POL. AcT. RPTR. 778 (1955). Of course,
partisan primaries do not fall within the exceptions even though no
party designation appears on the ballot. See STATE EMPLOYEE PAMPHLET,
supra note 27, at 3.
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members are elected on such a nonpartisan basis.80 However,
in at least two states some statewide offices are also nonpartisan,
and thus the exception applies.3 '
Although its purpose is clear, the wording of this exception
requires comment. It should be noted that the word "nonparti-
san" is not used. Instead, the factor determining whether an
election is open to participation is the representative status of
the candidates. If any candidate "represents" a party which had
a presidential candidate who received votes in the last election,
then all participation is precluded and the exception is inopera-
tive.82 If no such representative files for an office, the excep-
lion applies even though the election is not by state law required
to be nonpartisan. In such a situation, the public employee
could engage in political activity until a person representing a
party whose presidential nominee received at least one vote in
the last election becomes a candidate for the office in question.
In a community where the major parties traditionally are not
active in local elections, but by law could be, the existence of the
exception is subject to the caprices of local party leaders.83
The exception does not apply when any candidate "repre-
sents a party." Thus, the Commission has stated that if in a
nonpartisan election candidates are endorsed or supported by
parties, the exception may be inoperative.8 4 The point at which
such support becomes representation of a party is impossible to
determine with precision. Financial support of candidates may
not be known until after an election, and endorsements may be
unsolicited. Presumably, a state or local employee would be al-
lowed to participate in an election unless partisan support of one
candidate in the election was generally known and the candidate
receiving that support had either sought or made use of it.
The scope of the exception could be severely limited in
many jurisdictions if the term "election" is too broadly defined.
It is possible to construe that term as referring either to the fill-
80. See Ludwig, No Place for Parties, 48 NAT'L Crv. Rsv. 237, 238
(1959).
81. The states are Minnesota and Nebraska (the Minnesota legisla-
ture has, however, recently enacted legislation reinstating party desig-
nations for legislative elections. Minn. Laws 1973, ch. 3). See statement
of 3. ,May, Chairman, United States Civil Serv. Comm'n in 3 Comnvts-
sioN, supra note 1, at 16.
82. In re Cole, 1 POL. ACT. RPm. 1029 (1969); In re Pratt, 1 POL.
ACT. RrTi 1020 (1969).
83. See In re Cole, I POL. ACT. RPTR. 1029 (1969).
84. In re Broering, 1 POL. ACT. Ppm 778 (1955).
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ing of a particular public office or to the balloting for all offices
to be determined on a given date. If the latter interpretation is
adopted, state and local employees are precluded from activities
in connection with those local nonpartisan offices that, by coin-
cidence, are filled on the same day as a general, statewide, or
national election. This broad approach would seem to be so ar-
bitrary as to raise the question of its constitutionality. Although
none of the cases decided by the Civil Service Commission has
indicated adherence to the broad approach, its position is far
from clear.8,5 The former approach would seem to be more rea-
sonable. Thus, voting for each office should be considered a
separate election regardless of the fact that balloting for other
offices occurs on the same date and at the same polls.80
This exception for nonpartisan elections is subject to criti-
cism. A majority of the Commission on the Political Activity
of Government Personnel concluded that "there is no such thing
as a non-partisan campaign or non-partisan election. ' '8 7 A Cal-
ifornia study indicates that there are relationships between lo-
cal, state and national politics regardless of the participation of
major parties in local contests.8 8 Furthermore, the statutory
definition of a partisan election which ties it to votes for
electors for president and allows one party to contaminate an
otherwise nonpartisan election is cumbersome and arbitrary. A
better approach would be simply to allow participation in elec-
tions at certain levels of government regardless of partisan par-
ticipation.8 9 Some limitation ought, however, to be placed on
participation of an employee in the politics of the governmental
entity for which he works to avoid conflicts of interest, abuse of
position for political gain and disruptive conflicts within the en-
tity involved. The state or local employer, not the federal gov-
85. Counsel for the Commission on Political Activity of Govern-
ment Personnel was unable to decide what approach the United States
Civil Service Commission followed. The manager of a county employee
union felt that the broad definition of "election" was the law. 3 CoM-
miSSION, supra note 1, at 616-17, 622.
86. Cf. Akio Kuwahara v. Acheson, 96 F. Supp. 38, 41 (S.D. Cal
1951).
87. 1 CoMmISsIoN, supra note 1, at 23.
88. E. LEE, THE POLITICS OF NONPARTISANSHIP, A STUDY OF CALI-
FORNIA CITY ELECTIONS 4 (1960), cited in P. FORD, POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE 37 n.1 (Institute of Gov't Studies, Berkeley, Calif.,
Aug., 1963).
89. Compare the recommendations of the Commission on Politi-
cal Activity of Government Personnel. 1 CoMMIssIoN, supra note 1,
at 4.
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ernment, would be the appropriate agency to impose and enforce
such a restriction.
9. Referendums
In addition to excepting participation in elections where can-
didates do not represent a major political party, the Hatch Act
does not apply to political activity in connection with "a ques-
tion which is not specifically identified with a National or State
political party."90 The Act goes on to find that for the purposes
of this provision
questions relating to constitutional amendments, referendums,
approval of municipal ordinances, and others of a similar char-
acter, are deemed not specifically identified with a National or
State political party.9 '
It is not clear whether this finding is so conclusive as to exempt
activity even when political parties have supported or opposed a
referred question. The Civil Service Commission has not taken
a clear position on the matter.92  Thus the employee is faced
with the difficulty of determining whether a question is suffi-
ciently identified with a party to make the exception inopera-
tive. It is suggested that support or opposition to a referred
question by political parties should not be enough of an identi-
fication because party platforms frequently take positions on re-
ferred questions, especially constitutional amendments. Only
when major parties take opposing positions and make the matter
a major public issue would there be any justification for restrict-
ing public employees' activities, and even then it is conjectural
whether the Hatch Act imposes such a restriction.
10. Indirect Activities
In the past the Civil Service Commission has taken the posi-
tion that political activities of state and local employees which
are directly prohibited by the Act cannot be accomplished by
indirection.9" Under this view, employees would be accountable
90. 5 U.S.C. § 1503 (2) (1970).
91. Id. § 1503.
92. The United States Civil Service Commission does not appear
to have decided any cases involving referred questions. Its regula-
tions and literature are basically a rephrasing of part of the statute.
See 5 C.F.R. § 15.111(10) (1972) and STATE EMPLOYEE PAPEHLET, supra
note 27, at 2.
93. PAu'nrBmE 20, supra note 27, at 10; cf. Umr= STATES CrVm
SERV. Conw'ax, STATE Am LOcAL EWPLOYEES PoTr cAL PARmCIPATiON,
Question 4 (undated publication, predecessor to STATE EMPLOYEE PAM-
PH=r, supra note 27).
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for political activities of their spouses if engaged in collusively 4
Although the apparent purpose is simply to prevent circumven-
tion of the Hatch Act, such an application to members of an em-
ployee's family is troublesome. In addition to problems of proof
and interspousal immunity,9 this application of the statute has
the effect of restricting the voluntary acts not only of employees
but of their families as well. To avoid jeopardizing a husband's
or father's job, family members may simply avoid political ac-
tivity. This increases significantly the number of citizens af-
fected by the Act. Perhaps the enforcement problems and the
unfairness of such indirect restrictions explain the omission of
any reference to indirect activities involving family members in
the recent regulations, the pamphlet for state and local em-
ployees and other current documents.90 Hopefully, the Civil
Service Commission has decided to abandon its efforts to police
such activities.
Another type of indirect activity that remains a concern in-
volves government employee labor organizations. Unions ac-
tively and directly participate in the political process in connec-
tion with matters of particular concern to their members such
as wages and working conditions. In addition, unions have es-
tablished political education committees to work toward general
political goals such as the endorsement and election of candi-
dates.9 7 Although the Commission has recently made it clear
that active participation in political education committees is pro-
hibited,98 the extent of this prohibition in the case of indirect
participation has not been answered.9 9 The indirect use of offi-
94. PAMPHLET 20, supra note 27, at 10.
95. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2227-2245 (McNaughton rev.
1961). Generally administrative agencies observe common law privi-
leges. See 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADIVNISTRATVE LAw 310-11, 397 (1965).
96. See 5 C.F.R. Part 151 (1972); STATE EMPLOYEE PAMPHLET, supra
note 27. Indirect coercive solicitation is, of course, prohibited by both
the statute and the regulations. See 5 U.S.C. § 1502(a) (2) (1970); 5
C.F.R. § 151.121(b) (1972).
97. See Zon, Labor in Politics, 27 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 234
(1962).
98. UNITED STATES CIVIL SERV. COMM'N, supra note 93. See also
Letter from A. Mondello, General Counsel, United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n, to D. Johnson, Veterans Administration, Mar. 22, 1972, re-
printed in Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 274-75, stating that federal
employees could not solicit fellow employees to become members of
a political education committee and that union officials who were fed-
eral employees could not use their local organization to encourage such
enrollment. Presumably the same principles would apply to state and
local employees covered by the Hatch Act.
99. If a union political committee is supported wholly by con-
tributions from government employees covered by the Hatch Act, It is
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cial influence, coercion and other pernicious activities through
labor unions should, of course, be proscribed. Employee unions
should, however, be free to at least present their positions on
job related issues directly to the electorate and to influence the
elected officials that make these decisions. It would be unfair
for government to foreclose such presentation to the public sim-
ply because the employer is a governmental entity and the mat-
ters may be issues in political campaigns. In any event, unions
can be expected to contest strongly any attempt to interfere
with their political committees' activities.
The Civil Service Commission has stated that, in general,
What is prohibited generally is activity which prominently
identifies the individual with the success or failure of a parti-
san group, candidate, or political party. 00
Thus individual actions like voting, signing petitions, contribut-
ing, holding membership and attending meetings, along with any
nonpartisan activities, are permitted. Although the regulations
attempt to encourage full participation in public affairs, they
warn that the prohibited activities listed in the regulations are
not exclusive'' and that, unless a particular activity is expressly
authorized, an employee may engage in such activity only
in a manner which does not materially compromise the neu-
trality, efficiency, or integrity of his administration of federally
funded functions.102
Furthermore, the regulations warn that employees to whom the
Act applies may not engage in any activity prohibited by any
other federal, state or local law.1 03 The most severe limitation
prevails.
D. THE VAGUENESS PROBLEM
These open-ended warnings about the scope of Hatch Act re-
strictions exacerbate the problems resulting from the ambiguity
of the Act. Although a researcher with ample time can usually
describe with some certainty those acts that are permitted and
prohibited, it is doubtful that the typical employee can do so.
Furthermore, in trying to distinguish between permissible in-
an agent of persons covered by the Act. However, since political con-
tributions are generally permissible, these contributions and the com-
mittee's activities ought to be acceptable. There is no guide to the law
in this area. The United States Civil Service Commission's regulations
are silent on the subject.
100. STATE EMPLOYEE PAMPHLET, supra note 27, at 2.
101. 5 C.F.R. § 151.122(b) (1972).
102. Id. § 151.111(a) (12).
103. Id. § 151.111(b).
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dividual expression and taking "an active part in political man-
agement and political campaigns," it may be impossible to de-
termine in advance precisely what activities are prohibited.
1
'
0
This ambiguity of the restrictions when coupled with their
breadth has apparently been a source of some confusion to em-
ployees. Studies of both federal and state employees sponsored
by the Commission on Political Activity of Government Person-
nel found widespread misunderstanding. 0 5 Sixty-four per cent
of the federal employees interviewed thought that five or more
of 10 specific activities were prohibited when in fact they were
permissible. 10 Similarly, an appreciable number of state em-
ployees thought the Hatch Act prohibited activities that were in
fact permitted.10 7 The survey found that:
One fairly safe conclusion to be drawn .. .is that a moderate
degree of confusion exists about the specific forms of participa-
tion allowed .... 108
This confusion has discouraged participation in the political
process. In the more comprehensive survey of federal employ-
ees, it was revealed that one-sixth of those interested in greater
participation in political activity than the Hatch Act allowed re-
frained from engaging in activities that in fact were not prohib-
ited. 0 9
Since the results of the above survey were announced, the
United States Civil Service Commission has made praiseworthy
efforts to correct the problem of misinformation. The regula-
tions, Political Activity Reporter, and literature previously men-
tioned have hopefully clarified much misunderstanding.' 10 In
addition, the creation of a speaker's bureau and the continuing
practice of answering questions concerning proposed activities
may have helped. 1 ' Nonetheless, it is difficult to believe that
the confusion has been entirely eliminated. The problems are in
104. See text accompanying notes 40-49 supra, and Nelson, supra
note 40.
105. 2 CoMmissIoN, supra note 1, at 1-80.
106. 1 CoMMIssioN, supra note 1, 20.
107. 2 CoM nssioN, supra note 1, 74-75.
108. Id. at 10.
109. Id. at 15, 18. Seventeen per cent of the employees said that
they did not join political organizations or attend meetings because of
the restrictions.
110. See notes 27-29 supra.
111. STATE EMPLOYEE PAMPHLET, supra note 27, at contents page
and at 5. Employees with questions are urged to write or call the
Commission, and the Commission offers to have its attorneys meet with
groups of 30 to 60 officials representing state or local agencies to brief
them on the Act and to answer questions. Id.
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large part statutory, and employees are presumed to know the
correct interpretation of the Act. 1"2  Differences of opinion or
a mistake regarding meaning are no defense when a violation of
the Act is charged. The risks of a violation therefore fall en-
tirely on the employees, some of whom undoubtedly feel in-
capable of interpreting even the most clearly written material
and who are unwilling to risk their careers on the possibility of
an error. 13 Furthermore, the nuisance of obtaining opinions on
proposed political activity has an obvious chilling effect on the
expression of political opinion.
I. APPLICATION
The Hatch Act restrictions apply to most
[s]tate or local officer(s] or employee[s] ... whose principal
employment is in connection with an activity which is financed
in whole or in part by loans or grants made by the United
States or a Federal Agency .... 1 4
There are, however, three general categories of exceptions
(which will be examined in greater detail below). First, those
employed by educational and research institutions or agencies
are exempted."5  Second, those working in the legislative and
judicial branches of state and local government are subject only
to the criminal prohibition against the use of official authority in
connection with the election of federal officials, and then only if
they are employed in what the statute calls an "administrative
position."' ' 56 Third, elected state and local officials in the execu-
112. In re Ramshaw, 266 F. Supp. 73 (D. Idaho 1967); cf. Oklahoma
v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 61 F. Supp. 355 (D. Okla. 1945),
affd, 153 F.2d 280 (10th Cir. 1946), aff'd, 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
113. Violations of the Act can result in dismissal. See text ac-
companying notes 172-74 infra.
114. 5 U.S.C. § 1501(4) (1970). Another coverage provision is con-
tained in the Emergency Employment Act of 1971, which states that
neither the programs funded under the Act nor the administrators
thereof shall engage in "political activities in contravention of [5 U.S.C.
§§ 1501 to 1508 (1970)]." 42 U.S.C. § 4881(h) (Supp. I, 1971). The
significance of this provision is doubtful since this program is apparently
being dismantled. However, to the extent it is continued, it duplicates
the coverage provision of the Hatch Act with two exceptions: First, it
arguably applies to employees participating in certain state and local
government activities otherwise exempt from the Hatch Act, principally
those working for educational institutions. Second, the enforcement
responsibility appears to lie with the Secretary of Labor, not the United
States Civil Service Commission.
115. See text accompanying notes 151-52 infra.
116. 18 U.S.C. § 595 (1970). The title 5 restrictions apply only to
the executive branch. See 5 U.S.C. § 1501(2) (1970) set forth and dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 131-36 infra. A possible limitation
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tive branch are subject only to the provisions regarding abuse of
official authority and solicitation of contributions. 17 In sum,
the broad proscription of section 1502(a) (3) against taking "an
active part in political management or political campaigns" does
not apply to any of these three groups.
Ascertaining whether a particular employee is subject to the
Hatch Act ought to be easy. In theory, it is necessary to deter-
mine only the individual's principal employment, whether it is
with a state or local agency, whether it is in connection with a
federally funded activity and whether any exceptions apply.
However, questions of statutory construction and application
arise at each step.
A. PRINCIPAL EMPLOYMENT
Before one is subject to any of the restrictions of section
1502(a), his "principal employment" must be in connection with
a federally assisted activity.118 In the past, the most trouble-
some principal employment question arose in situations of dual
employment. If one of the positions is in connection with an ac-
tivity financed in whole or in part with federal funds, the ques-
tion is whether this position is the individual's principal employ-
ment. Although the Civil Service Commission originally held
that the statute required that only the principal public employ-
ment need be in connection with federally financed activities,"0
this construction was rejected by the courts. 120  In the case of
dual employment, the principal employment is currently deter-
mined by the amount of time spent on each job and the income
on this exception exists if the legislative or judicial branch hires people
under the Emergency Employment Act of 1971. Any state or local
employee administering such a program is then subject to the Hatch
Act. See note 114 supra.
117. 5 U.S.C. § 1502(c) (1970); 18 U.S.C. § 595 (1970). See text ac-
companying notes 153-56 infra.
118. 5 U.S.C. § 1501(4) (1970). The principal employment require-
ment is not a part of 18 U.S.C. § 595 (1970).
119. See early Commission rule and decisions discussed at length
in Anderson v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 119 F. Supp. 567
(D. Mont. 1954). See also Matturi v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n,
130 F. Supp. 15 (D.N.J. 1955), aff'd per curiam, 229 F.2d 435 (3d Cir.
1956).
120. Matturi v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 130 F. Supp. 15
(D.N.J. 1955), aff'd per curiam, 229 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1956), and Ander-
son v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 119 F. Supp. 567 (D. Mont.
1954); see Utah v. United States, 286 F.2d 30 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 918 (1961); Smyth v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 291 F.
Supp. 568 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
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produced by each.121 Therefore, if a private job or public job not
related to a federally financed activity is determined to be the
principal employment, none of the restrictions of the Hatch Act
applies to the employee.122
Some persons charged with Hatch Act violations have ar-
gued that, although they have but one public job, they devote
most of their work time on that job to activities which are not
federally assisted and that they are therefore not subject to the
restrictions on political activity.1 23 The Commission has rejected
this argument on the ground that such a construction of the
words "principal employment" renders meaningless the express
statutory exception for persons who exercise no function in con-
nection with federally assisted activities.12 4 Instead, the Com-
mission has taken the position that any employee whose princi-
pal employment is with any agency receiving federal funds is
covered by the Hatch Act if, as a normal and foreseeable incident
of his employment, he performs any duties in connection with
federally financed activities. 2 5 That the bulk of his work is in
connection with activities not so financed is irrelevant
The only exception to this rule exists where the employee's
connection with the federally financed work is de minimns. 1 -2 0
121. STATE EMLOYEE PAlMHLET, supra note 27, at 1. See Anderson
v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 119 F. Supp. 567 (D. Mont. 1954);
cf. Smyth v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 291 F. Supp. 568 (ED.
Wis. 1968).
122. Of course, part-time state and local employees are not subject
to the restrictions of 5 U.S.C. § 1502(a) (1970) if the part-time employ-
ment is not their principal employment. Thus, the restrictions regard-
ing part-time federal employees are not applicable to state and local
employees. This discrepancy occurs because the federal coverage pro-
visions contain no principal employment requirement.
123. In 'e Hutchins, 2 POL. ACT. RTRn. 160 (1944); In re Hankins,
2 PoL. ACT. Rpm. 121 (1944); In re Slaymaker, 2 POL. ACT. Rrm 56
(1943); In re Fleming, 2 PoL. ACT. Rpm. 1 (1943); cf. Palmer v. United
States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 297 F.2d 450 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 849 (1962).
124. In re Hutchins, 2 POL. ACT. Rm. 160 (1944); In re Slaymaker,
2 PoL. ACT. RPm 56 (1943). These decisions contain a thorough analysis
of this issue. The statutory provision in question, 5 U.S.C. § 1501(4)
(1970), provides:
(4) "State or local officer or employee" means an indi-
vidual employed by a State or local agency whose principal
employment is in connection with an activity which is financed
in whole or in part by loans or grants made by the United States
or a Federal agency, but does not include-(A) an individual who exercises no functions in con-
nection with that activity ....
125. In re Hutchins, 2 POL. ACT. RPTR. 160 (1944); In re Slaymaker,
2 PoL. AT. RPm. 56 (1943).
126. In re Todd, 2 POL. ACT. Rpe. 49 (1943). (If only one-tenth of
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The de minimus exception was mentioned in Palmer v. United
States Civil Service Commission,'2 7 where the Director of the Il-
linois Department of Conservation was held subject to the Act
even though as director he estimated that only one per cent of
his time was spent on the federally funded activities of his de-
partment. Apparently the fact that eight per cent of his de-
partment's revenue consisted of federal grants and that six of
the nine divisions in the department received some federal as-
sistance led the court to conclude that overall responsibilities for
federally financed projects as distinguished from actual time de-
voted to such projects determined whether the connection was
de minimus.128 Using this approach, the de minimus exception
is virtually unavailable to high level officials.
The Commission has also determined that the Hatch Act ap-
plies to employees who are on a leave of absence. 12  This pre-
vents resorting to leaves of absence to participate in political ac-
tivity and protects employees from pressure to take such leaves.
It could be argued, however, that once a person takes a leave of
absence without pay that the employment he has left is not his
present principal employment; it is only his former and, at his
election, his future principal employment. Furthermore, it is not
clear that it is necessary to prohibit employees from engaging in
political activities while on leaves of absence. At least two states
expressly provide for such leaves to allow employees to run for
political office. 130 Permitting such leaves of absence is a desira-
ble way of ameliorating the harshness of political activity re-
strictions.
B. "STATE OR LOCAL AGENCY"
Although it is obvious that a state or local employee re-
one per cent of a person's time is spent on federally assisted activities,
this is de minimus. It also cites with apparent approval a court decision
indicating that 1.76% is de minimus.)
127. 297 F.2d 450, 453 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 849 (1962).
128. Although the court of appeals found that Palmer spent 50% of
his time in connection with federally financed activities, there is no
basis in the reported decisions for this conclusion. See Palmer v.
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 297 F.2d 450 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 849 (1962), rev'g 191 F. Supp. 495 (S.D. Ill. 1961), rev'g 2 POL.
AcT. Rpmn. 590 (1959). The only possible explanation for the court's
apparent error is that 50% of the divisions and boards within the de-
partment might have been receiving federal funds.
129. STATE EMPLOYEE PAMPHLET, supra note 27, at 1 states that:
An employee subject to political activity laws and regulations
continues to be covered while on annual leave, sick leave,
leave without pay, administrative leave, or furlough.
130. MiNN. STAT. § 43.28 (1971); N.J. AD. CoDE 4:1-17.5 (1971).
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stricted by the Hatch Act must be employed by a state or local
governmental entity, not all such entities are within the statu-
tory definition. According to the statutes an individual must be
employed by what is called a "state or local agency."1 3 1 This
term is defined as
the executive branch of a State, municipality, or other political
subdivision of a State, or an agency or department thereof
132
Individuals employed by the judicial and legislative branches
of state and local government are not within the foregoing defi-
nition. This parallels the implied exception for legislative and
judicial employees of the federal government '3 3 and was per-
haps provided because of the small number of such employees
and the lack of concern over their political activities at the time
the Hatch Act was passed. If, however, the political activities
of public employees need to be restricted for the integrity and
efficiency of the public service, it is difficult to understand why
personnel of the judicial branch should be excluded. The neces-
sity of insulating them from political activities would seem
clearly greater than in the case of administrators.
Two problems are presented by the restriction to the execu-
tive branch. First, the classical division of government into
three branches is difficult to apply to local government and cer-
tain state agencies. In the so-called weak mayor municipalities,
for example, the city council, which is theoretically the legisla-
tive branch, has direct responsibility for the administration of
many programs. 34 The same holds true for county commis-
sioners.135 Are the employees working under these legislative
bodies employed by the legislative rather than the executive
branch? Although the Civil Service Commission has not spoken
to this issue, one would expect some difficulty in reconciling the
language of the statute to situations where coverage would seem
to be appropriate. It is suggested that at the local level the
"executive branch" requirement should not be taken too liter-
131. 5 U.S.C. § 1501(4) (1970).
132. Id. § 1501(2). Community action agencies involved in the pov-
erty program are defined as state or local agencies for purposes of 5
U.S.C. ch. 15 (1970). See 42 U.S.C. § 2943 (a) (1970).
133. See 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a) (1970).
134. See, e.g., J. PHmLips, MUNICIPAL GovERNmi:r AND ADMnus~nA-
TIoN n-T AwmucA 281-82 (1960). Perhaps because of this problem the
executive branch qualification is not present in the Hatch Act coverage
of employees of the District of Columbia. See 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a) (1970).
135. See L DUNCoWBE, CouNTY GovERNPMzN an AMmUcA 47-49
(1966).
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ally, because an overly literal reading would result in very arbi-
trary differences in coverage from city to city depending upon
the particular form of government involved. Categorization by
governmental branch is more feasible at the state level. Even
there, however, the existence of certain agencies like workmen's
compensation commissions and rate-making bodies which basi-
cally exercise judicial or legislative powers confuse the situa-
tion.136 A second problem that arises under the state or local
agency requirements relates to individuals who are employed by
two branches of government. For example, an individual may
serve as a state legislator and be employed by an urban renewal
program. This situation is discussed below.13 7
C. CONNECTION WITH FEDERALLY AIDED ACTIVITY
In addition to problems of determining what constitutes an
employee's principal employment and whether it is with a state
or local agency, determination of coverage may be complicated
by the nature of the particular employee's connection with the
federally financed activity. Although it has been argued that
for an employee to be subject to the restrictions of the Hatch Act
his wages must come from federal funds, the Commission has re-
jected this requirement. 38 Thus, in one proceeding an engineer
in charge of procuring rights-of-way for highway projects who
136. See generally 1 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATiVE LAW § 1.09 (1958).
Another aspect of this problem which has not received any attention from
the Civil Service Commission involves public corporations and public-
private joint ventures. It is not difficult to imagine quasi-public proj-
ects in which state or local governments participate and federal moneys
are provided. Whether such projects are a part of the executive branch
of government so that the employees are subject to the Hatch Act is
unclear. However, it is difficult to distinguish them from employees of
government contractors and, except for private organizations receiving
funds under the Economic Opportunity Act, Congress has not yet ex-
tended the Hatch Act to any private employees. See STATE EMPLOYEE
PAMPHLET, supra note 27, at 1, apparently relying on 42 U.S.C. § 2943
(b) (1970).
137. See text accompanying notes 157-61 infra.
138. In re Bollettieri, 2 POL. ACT. RPTR. 674 (1962); In re Knies, 2
POL. ACT. RPT. 578, 584 (1958); In re Tinstman, 2 POL. ACT. RPT. 313(1948); In re Duberstein, 2 POL. ACT. RPT. 131 (1944); In re Slaymaker,
2 POL. ACT. RPTR. 56 (1943); In re Huiet, 2 POL. ACT. RPT. 100 (1942).
Although the courts have not considered the issue, several of the cases
in which violations of the Hatch Act have been upheld have involved
heads of state departments or boards. See Oklahoma v. United States
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947); Palmer v. United States Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 297 F.2d 450 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 849 (1962);
Engelhardt v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 197 F. Supp. 806 (M.D.
Ala. 1961), aff'd per curiam, 304 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1962). Presumably
these high state officials were paid entirely with state funds.
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was compensated by the state was held to be within the coverage
of the Act since most of the projects would be financed with fed-
eral moneys.139 The Commission reasoned that the statute re-
quired only that an individual's employment be "in connection
with" a federally assisted activity, that but for the federally as-
sisted activity the state paid employee would not have been
hired, that the opportunity for pernicious political activities was
made possible because of the federal funds, and that the Hatch
Act should therefore apply. Such a result is perhaps justified
by the difficulty of determining who is being paid with federal
funds in activities where the state or locality involved is to
share in costs and where budgets do not specify what parts of
which salaries are to be paid with the moneys being provided by
the different governmental entities. It is also possibly justified
by the arbitrariness and room for manipulation that the con-
trary position would allow. It is suggested, however, that the
rationale is dangerously broad. It could be construed as forcing
the states and localities to require all of their employees who
perform anything more than a de minimus role in a federally
assisted activity to abide by federal restrictions regardless of
who ultimately pays them. Whenever a causal relation between
the existence of their state position and the federally assisted
activity is clear, the possibility of federal domination of the po-
litical lives of state and local employees exists.
Although the Civil Service Commission has determined that
an engineer working on acquisition of rights-of-way for highway
construction was sufficiently connected to the federally assisted
activity of construction, it has also held that persons employed
by the same state agencies to maintain highways are not suf-
ficiently connected with the federal activity to render them
subject to the restrictions of the Act.140 Similarly, in the case of
a person employed to supervise the construction of private proj-
ects-such as driveways-related to highways, the Commission
has held that the relationship is too collateral to satisfy the "in
connection with" requirement.141 Although this latter de-
cision is a welcome indication that the Commission will impose
limits on its jurisdiction, the difficulty of predicting when a suf-
ficient relationship exists to subject an employee to coverage still
remains.
139. In re Duberstein, 2 POL. AcT. Rpm 131 (1944).
140. In re Todd, 2 POL. AcT. Rpm 49 (1943).
141. In re Pearson, 2 POL. AcT. RIm. 70 (1943).
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The only judicial indication of the limits of the connection
requirement came in a case where the state, in dismissing an
employee, defended its action in part on the ground that the
employee had from time to time worked on federally funded
projects and his political activity therefore violated the Hatch
Act.' 42 The court rejected the defense in part because the plain-
tiff had not worked on such projects for seven months prior to
the political activity. An additional factor the court might have
considered was the intermittent nature of the connection. Nev-
ertheless, the determination is correct-no state or local em-
ployee should be held to have a connection with a federally
funded activity unless it is a regular incident of his employ-
ment.
What constitutes an activity funded in whole or in part with
federal moneys may in some situations also be a problem. Fed-
eral programs offering financial aid to state and local units of
government were at one time limited to relatively few areas.
Today, however, federal funds are available in virtually all
fields, and few state agencies or local units of government re-
ceive no federal funds.143 A greatly expanded coverage of the
Hatch Act resulting from the pervasive availability of federal
aid was, however, rejected by the court in Brooks v. Nacrelli,'14'
where voters sought an injunction against election day political
activities of the local police on the ground, inter alia, that the
police department received federal moneys. In denying relief
the court noted that of the department's total annual budget of
over one million dollars, only $252 or one-fortieth of one per
cent had come from the federal government. It stated that the
de minimus rule applied in such a situation.145
The definition of activity is also a problem when the federal
funds are given to the state, which in turn allocates them among
various communities and state agencies. Since these funds from
the federal government are for restricted, identifiable programs
and are distributed pursuant to federally approved schemes, the
Commission has held the programs supported with these funds
142. Wisconsin State Employees Ass'n v. Wisconsin Nat. Resources
Bd., 298 F. Supp. 339 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
143. See, e.g., H. ROWLAND, THE NEw YORK TIMES GUIDE TO FEDERAL
AID FOR CITIES AND TowNs (1971).
144. 331 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
145. The de minimus rule is discussed in text accompanying notes
126-28 supra.
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to be activities whose employees are subject to the Hatch Act.' 4"
Another variation on the problem of whether an employee
works in connection with a federally assisted program occurs
when federal funds are used to reimburse the state or local
agency for expenses already incurred. The Civil Service Com-
mission has taken the position that political activities by per-
sons employed in connection with projects so financed are sub-
ject to the Hatch Act only after the federal commitment to re-
imburse has been made.147
With the advent of revenue sharing 148 it is questionable
whether under the present statutory scheme there will remain
any limit on the coverage of the Act. It would seem that since
the programs that benefit from revenue sharing would be nei-
ther designated by nor identified with the federal government,
the need to apply the Hatch Act to state and local governments
would be lacking. The Civil Service Commission is, however,
evidently planning to enforce the Act with respect to employees
who work in programs financed with revenue sharing funds.14
D. ExcEm ONs
There are several exceptions to the restrictions imposed by
the Hatch Act. The implicit exclusion of individuals employed
by the legislative or judicial branches of government has al-
ready been noted.10 Also noted was the exception for persons
working in educational and research institutions or agencies.1 51
This exception is understandable. Educational and research in-
stitutions have traditionally been run on a merit system and
free from partisan political influence. It has, however, been
146. In re Bollettieri, 2 POL. AcT. Rpm. 674 (1962); In -re Stevens,
2 POL. AcT. Rpm. 482 (1954); In re Walsh, 2 POL. AcT. Rpm. 382 (1949).
147. In re Bollettieri, 2 PoL. AcT. RPTR. 674, 681-82 (1962) (citing
other decisions).
148. State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
512, 86 Stat. 919.
149. Letter from L. Collins, Office of General Counsel, United States
Civil Serv. Comm'n to author, Dec. 11, 1972.
150. See text accompanying notes 131-37 supra.
151. 5 U.S.C. § 1501(4) (b) (1970), 18 U.S.C. § 595 (1970). The ex-
ception also applies to employees of religious, philanthropic and cultural
institutions. This, however, seems to be surplusage since the Act never
purported to cover such institutions or their employees regardless of
their source of funding. See In re Cook, 2 POL. AcT. RPr. 516, 520 (1955).
An exception to this exception for employees of educational and research
institutions apparently exists for those educational and research em-
ployees administering programs funded under the Emergency Employ-
ment Act of 1971. See note 114 supra.
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suggested that the exception is unduly broad in excepting all
educational agencies, since this includes state departments of ed-
ucation which perform no instructional functions and which
may be politicized as easily as any other state department.'1 2
A partial exception to the coverage of the Act is available to
the following:
(1) the Governor or Lieutenant Governor of a State or an in-
dividual authorized by law to act as Governor;
(2) the mayor of a city;
(3) a duly elected head of an executive department of a State
or municipality who is not classified under a State or mu-
nicipal merit or civil service system; or(4) an individual holding elective office. 15 3
Such officials are excepted only from the general restrictions of
section 1502(a) (3) regarding taking "an active part in political
management or in political campaigns."''- Thus, any such
named official may not (1) use his official authority to influence
elections or (2) solicit political contributions from other state or
local employees in any overbearing manner.'5 The former re-
striction is not so much a limitation on voluntary political activ-
ity as a prohibition against abuse of the employment position
for the benefit of a candidate for office. The latter proscribes
any type of coercive solicitation of state and local officers and
employees. Its application would seem to be mainly to those
holding positions where they can affect subordinates or others
because of their powers. The effect of the application to and en-
forcement of these restrictions against elected officials is, how-
ever, unclear. Theoretically, they would prohibit a governor
whose contacts with federally financed programs are more than
de minimus from either using the powers of his office to affect
the political process or indirectly advising another state official
or employee to make a contribution. That such acts take place
seems certain. With one exception, however, the Civil Service
Commission has not taken any steps which indicate such activi-
ties violate the Hatch Act.' 50 If the Commission did attempt to
152. See testimony of J. Ecker, Regional Representative, Office of
State Merit Systems, Dept. of H.E.W., 3 CoMMissIoN, supra note 1, at
307.
153. 5 U.S.C. § 1502(c) (1970).
154. 5 U.S.C. § 1502(a) (3) (1970) set forth in text following note 14
supra.
155. Id. § 1502(a) (1), (2), set forth in text following note 14 supra
and discussed at length in Friedman & Klinger, The Hatch Act: Regu-
lation by Administrative Action of Political Activities of Governmental
Employees (Part II), 7 FED. B.J. 138, 141-44 (1945).
156. See In re Huiet, 2 PoL. AcT. RPTR. 100 (1942) where, although an
elected state Commissioner of Labor was held subject to the Civil Serv-
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enforce broad limits on the political actions of high elected offi-
cials, serious problems in intergovernmental relations would
develop.
A ticklish problem of statutory construction is presented
when a person employed in connection with a federally aided
activity is also employed in a capacity or elected to an office ex-
empt from the Act. In two cases, the executive director of a
park authority and an employee of a local housing authority,
both of which received federal moneys, held second positions as
a state legislator and an alderman respectively. ' 57 In both cases
the courts refused to exempt them from the Hatch Act as elected
officials in the legislative branch of government. It was pointed
out that in the original 1940 version of the Hatch Act a section
had allowed candidates for office as of the date the Act was
passed to continue to be candidates and retain their positions
with federally assisted agencies provided that they would have
to resign if elected. 15 Furthermore, the courts observed, per-
sons holding nonpartisan office "hold elected office," but no one
could contend that they are thus entitled to engage in any parti-
san activities free from Hatch Act restrictions. These two points
were felt to indicate a lack of congressional intent to exempt
totally everyone holding elected office from the restrictions of
section 1502 (a) (3). Thus, it was held that persons whose prin-
cipal employment was in connection with federally aided activi-
ties were not exempt simply because they had concurrent inci-
dental employment as holders of elective office. Presumably,
anyone who was incidentally employed in the legislative or judi-
cial branches of government or by an educational or research
institution would similarly be subject to the Hatch Act if his
principal employment was in the executive branch in connection
with a federally assisted activity.119
ice Commission's jurisdiction, the Commission decided that the evidence
was not sufficient to warrant a finding of violation of either restriction.
It appears that subordinates, sometimes using overbearing tactics, col-
lected funds for Mr. Huiet's campaigns. It was disputed, however,
whether he knew these collections were anything other than wholly
voluntary.
157. Northern Va. Reg. Park Auth. v. United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 437 F.2d 1346 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 936 (1971);
In re Higginbotham, 340 F.2d 165 (3d Cir.); cert. denied, 382 U.S. 853
(1965) (housing authority).
158. Act of July 19, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-753, ch. 640, § 4 "17," 54
Stat. 767. Because of its transitional nature this provision was elimi-
nated in recodification.
159. See I re Cook, 2 POL. AcT. Rpm. 516 (1955).
19731
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Assuming the need for restrictions on political candidacy
and activities, this construction limiting the exceptions is cor-
rect. Any other approach would allow otherwise covered em-
ployees to evade coverage by simply having an incidental con-
nection with an exempt position. It should, however, be recog-
nized that this construction renders the section 1502(b)(4) ex-
ception for "an individual holding elective office" virtually
meaningless. 160 In addition, persons holding excluded offices,
such as lieutenant governors and mayors who may be part-time
office holders, could be held subject to all the restrictions of the
Act if their principal employment was in connection with a fed-
erally assisted activity in another level or agency of govern-
ment.161 Although a compromise such as allowing political ac-
tivity only in connection with the named elective office would
be possible, such a solution assumes that a person can segregate
his political life from his principal employment-an assumption
that the Hatch Act rejects.
One recurring criticism of the Act is that it does not except
state officials appointed by the governor who hold cabinet level
positions. 16 2 Since such officials are usually political appointees
directly responsible to the governor, it is unrealistic to expect
them to divorce themselves from political activity and virtually
impossible to shield them from political pressures.'6 3 Further,
since some states may appoint officials that other states elect, it
160. In dealing with this problem the courts have assumed that
the fourth exception was created for elected state officers who may head
agencies receiving federal funds. See cases in note 157 supra. How-
ever, such an approach ignores the third exception which is obviously
available for such employees.
161. In several states lieutenant governors receive nominal sal-
aries necessitating other employment. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODs § 54-
08-03 (1971 Supp.) ($2,000 per year); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 2-4-3
(1972 Supp.) ($7,000 per biennium).
162. See, e.g., Welsh, The Hatch Act and the States, 37 STATE GOV'T
8 (1964). It is interesting to note that as initially drafted and reported
from the Senate Committee, the 1940 amendments to the Hatch Act
excepted
Officers . . . appointed by the Governor of any State by and
with the advice and consent of the legislature of either house
thereof, and who determine policies to be pursued by such
State in the State-wide administration of State laws.
86 CONG. REc. 2566 (1940) (remarks of Senator Clark).
163. Several cases have involved such officials and resulted in their
removal. See Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S.
127 (1947); Palmer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 297 F.2d 450
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 849 (1962); Engelhardt v. United States
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 197 F. Supp. 806 (M.D. Ala. 1961), aff'd per curiam,
304 F.2d 882 (1962).
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is contended that the Act arbitrarily discriminates against
the employees of some states. 04 The exclusion of heads and as-
sistant heads of federal departments and all persons in the Of-
fice of the President from that part of the Hatch Act applying to
federal employees evidences a double standard.' 65 The Com-
mission on Political Activity of Government Personnel has rec-
ommended that this disparity be corrected by excluding from
coverage persons holding such positions at the state level'16
Finally, it should be noted that the Civil Service Commission
has rejected attempts by employees to evade the restrictions of
the Act. Ploys such as taking a leave of absence to engage in
political activities,167 reductions in responsibilities so as to acquire
a different principal employment, 168 and temporary stoppage of
federal funds to avoid coverage 6 9 have not been successful. The
one ploy that does succeed is for the state or local government
to allocate the responsibilities among departments or agencies
so as to leave certain ones with no activities that are federally
financed. The political employees can then work in such depart-
ments free from the restrictions of the Act, a situation that ap-
parently exists in at least one jurisdiction.1 70  However, for the
employee who works in connection with federally financed ac-
tivities, the only way to avoid the restrictions is to resign.
IV. ENFORCEMENT
All determinations of violations of the Hatch Act by state
and local employees are made by the United States Civil Service
Commission.' 17  Neither the federal agencies administering the
programs nor the states participate in these determinations. If
a violation is found, the Commission must further determine
whether it warrants removal of the offender from his position.'7 2
164. See Welsh, supra note 162, at 10.
165. 5 U.S.C. § 7324(d) (1), (2), (3) (1970).
166. 1 CommIssioN, supra note 1, at 42.
167. See note 129 supra.
168. See Smyth v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 291 F. Supp.
568 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
169. See In re Ramshaw, 266 F. Supp. 73 (E.D. Idaho 1967).
170. See Testimony of W. Collins, Director, Institute of Government,
University of Georgia in 3 CommissioN, supra note 1, at 312.
171. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1504-1508 (1970). For a comprehensive but dated
treatment of enforcement procedures and judicial review see Friedman
& Klinger, supra note 155, at 152-66. See also Annot., 8 A.L.RL Fed. 343,
355-64 (1971). Direct enforcement in court by citizens groups is appar-
ently precluded. See Brooks v. Nacrelli, 331 F. Supp. 1350 (ED. Pa.
1971).
172. 5 U.S.C. § 1505 (1970). Mitigating factors in deciding whether
removal is warranted include the nature of the offense, the importance
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If the Commission finds that removal is warranted, it makes such
a recommendation to the state or local employer.'73  The em-
ploying unit of government then has the choice of either remov-
ing the offender and not re-employing him for a period of 18
months or losing federal funds equal to the amount the offender
would earn in two years.174 Since the employee cannot be re-
employed for 18 months if the Act is violated and removal is rec-
ommended, his resignation before any 'determination does not
make matters moot. 175 Judicial review of a determination is
available at the request of any aggrieved party,170 a term that
has been construed to include both the employee and the entity
of government employing him.17
In the event the employee is removed, he may not be re-
employed by any part of the executive branch or any political
subdivision of the same state whether it receives federal funds
or not.'78 Thus, employment of a former state official by a
municipality would probably trigger a withholding of funds. 170
of the violator's position, actions taken by violator after charges are
made, advice of legal counsel, job record and whether violation is volun-
tary act or directed by superior. See Friedman & Klinger, supra note
155, at 161-63. See also Utah v. United States, 286 F.2d 30 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 918 (1961). These factors in mitigation of penalties
should not be confused with defenses to the charge of violation itself.
None of the factors apparently constitutes such a defense. See Utah v.
United States, id. See also Friedman & Klinger, supra note 155, at
160-61.
Both this penalty and the proceeding are considered to be civil, not
criminal, in nature. See Wages v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n,
170 F.2d 182 (6th Cir. 1948); cf. Pfitzinger v. United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 96 F. Supp. 1 (D.N.J.), aff'd per curiam, 192 F.2d 934 (3d Cir.
1951).
173. 5 U.S.C. § 1505 (1970).
174. Id. § 1506(a). The only exception to the withholding require-
ment is when it would jeopardize the payment of the principal or in-
terest on obligations of the recipient governmental entity. Id. § 1506
(c).
175. See Neustein v. Mitchell, 52 F. Supp. 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
176. 5 U.S.C. § 1508 (1970).
177. Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127
(1947); Ohio v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 65 F. Supp. 776 (S.D.
Ohio 1946). Whether members of the public who take an interest in
the matter may appeal is not clear. Perhaps with the expanded no-
tions of standing, others who are affected could appeal. See, e.g., As-
sociation of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
178. 5 U.S.C. § 1506(a) (1970). Ohio v. United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 65 F. Supp. 776 (S.D. Ohio 1946). That the initial employer
no longer maintains the position the errant employee had filled or that
the 'employer no longer receives federal funds for his position is also
no excuse for subsequent reemployment. Id.
179. Funds would be withheld from the second employer. 5 U.S.C.
§ 1506(a) (1970). If, however, the second employer received no fed-
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Employment within the legislative or judicial branch would,
however, presumably be permissible since they are not "agen-
cies" as defined by the statute.180 Whether election to public
office in the executive branch at any level would constitute
an impermissible re-employment is uncertain. However, since
it involves no voluntary employing action by a state or local
agency, withholding of funds would be an unreasonable punitive
step.
Since it began enforcing the Act in 1940, the Commission has
received over one thousand complaints;18 ' it has found that in
162 cases violations occurred,1 8 2 and that in 80 of these the viola-
tion warranted removal 8 3 Compliance with the Commission's
recommendations of dismissal has been less than complete. In
the last 10 years the Commission has ordered funds withheld in
eight cases-approximately 30 per cent of the cases in which
violations were found to warrant removal. 8 4
The effectiveness and fairness of the results of these pro-
ceedings may be questioned. It is difficult to believe that only
162 state and local employees have violated the Hatch Act in
thirty-two years.18 5 Even in those cases in which violations are
eral funds the Commission would apparently order the funds withheld
from the initial employer. Absent some control by the initial employer
over the second employer, such a withholding from the initial em-
ployer would not have a deterrent impact on the second employer.
180. See 5 U.S.C. § 1501(2) (1970); cf. Ohio v. United States Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 65 F. Supp. 776 (S.D. Ohio 1946). Since educational in-
stitutions are such agencies and only their employees are exempt, it is
not as clear that one could work for them after a violation. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 1501(4) (B) (1970).
181. See UNITED STATES CIVIL SERv. Comm'N, 1967 ANNUAL REiorT
66 (1968). This is the last year the Commission's reports gave figures
for complaints. During the years 1963 to 1967 the Commission received
an average of 44 complaints a year. Id. at 67. The number apparently
increased dramatically in the 1972 election year. One news report in-
dicated that complaints concerning state and local employees had in-
creased 90% over 1968. Wall Street Journal, Oct. 31, 1972, at 1, col. 5.
182. 1967 AwNUAL REPORT, supra note 181, at 66, where the cumula-
tive total to June 30, 1967 is given. The Commission's ANNUAL RE-
PoRTs for 1968, 1969, 1970 and 1971 contain the figures for those years at
pages 83, 71, 73 and 78 respectively.
183. Id.
184. Id. and ANNUAL REPoRTs for 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965 and 1966 at
64, 67-68, 70, 73 and 61-62 respectively.
185. One commentator implies that the problem of enforcing the
Hatch Act is comparable to enforcing prohibition. See T. PAGE, PoLrICAL
AcTrvrry IN T=E PUBLIC SERVICE 6 (Dep't Pol. Sci., Univ. IlM, 1961) cited
in P. FoRD, POLrICAL Acrn Ims AND THE PUBLIC SERWICE 14 (Institute of
Gov't Studies, Berkeley, Calif., Aug., 1963). The Commission on Politi-
cal Activity of Government Personnel suggested that the enforcement
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reported and found, many states are evidently willing to forfeit
the equivalent of two years salary rather than dismiss a valued
employee. 18 6 Proposals that the penalty be increased to as much
as twenty-five times the annual salary of the offending employee
have been advanced to remedy this situation.1 8 7 Although the
most effective manner of enforcement would be to give the Civil
Service Commission the power to remove employees who violate
the Hatch Act, doubt regarding the power of Congress to do any
more than authorize the withholding of federal funds is the
probable reason for the lack of such action.
The procedure may also be criticized as unfair because the
Commission's authority is limited to withholding funds vel non,
there being no provision for sanctions more or less severe as may
be appropriate in a particular case. Recommendations of sus-
pension for shorter periods, or on the other hand, total removal,
should be available to the Commission in cases involving state
and local employees just as they are in cases involving federal
employees.18 8
In enforcement proceedings, the Commission assumes the
burden of proving both the applicability of the statute and the
fact of violation. 8 9 If, however, the Commission establishes that
an individual is employed in connection with a federally assisted
activity, it expects him to produce evidence showing that the em-
ployment is not his principal one. 190 The Commission has also
taken the position that employees are responsible for ascertain-
ing whether they are subject to the Act-ignorance of coverage
problem results from the lack of an adequate budget. It recom-
mended a tenfold increase in funds for this purpose. 1 CoMmissioN
supra note 1, at 26. Recently, however, there is some indication that
enforcement may be becoming more effective. See Wall Street Journal,
supra note 181.
186. See 3 CoMimssioN, supra note 1, at 357. The fact that funds
had to be cut off in 30% of the recent cases supports this conclusion.
187. See S. 3417, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1633(d) (1972), 1 COMmissION,
supra note 1, at 43.
188. See 5 U.S.C. § 7325 (1970). Section 1634(a) of the legislation
proposed by the Commission on Political Activity would give the Civil
Service Commission much greater flexibility. See 1 CoMMissIoN, su-
pra note 1, at 54.
189. Smyth v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 291 F. Supp. 568
(E.D. Wis. 1968). Of course, in judicial review the Commission's deter-
minations are not to be reversed unless unsupported by substantial
evidence. Jarvis v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 382 F.2d 339
(6th Cir. 1967).
190. Smyth v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 291 F. Supp. 568
(E.D. Wis. 1968).
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is no defense.191 Similarly, as noted above, a mistake as to
whether the Hatch Act proscribes certain activity is no de-
fense.192 Such positions are harsh in those situations where
coverage is uncertain and the restrictions vague. Although the
Commission will, if requested advise a state or local employee
whether he is covered, just as it will give such advice on whether
contemplated activity is permissible, 193 the formalities of secur-
ing a ruling undoubtedly discourage many from engaging in
political activity. This chilling effect is of particular concern
because of the special importance and protection the freedom of
political activity is generally accorded in this country. 104
V. FEDERAL STANDARDS FOR A MERIT SYSTEM
The provisions of the Hatch Act apply to state and local em-
ployees irrespective of whether they are part of or subject to
any civil service system. To qualify for certain federal grant
programs, however, states are required to establish merit systems
for personnel administration and to adhere to standards promul-
gated by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.'95 The
standards thus promulgated 96 include the following provision
regarding political activity:
Participation in partisan political activity by an employee sub-ject to these standards will be prohibited with respect to activ-
ity prohibited in federally grant-aided programs under the Fed-
eral Hatch Political Activities Act, as amended, 5 U.S.C. 1501-
1508.197
Thus, the federal standard for political activity of state and local
employees subject to merit systems is duplicative of substantive
provisions of the Hatch Act. The existence of this standard has,
however, given rise to greater limitations on political activity.
Although the Hatch Act restrictions must, at a minimum, be
applied by the states, some jurisdictions in drafting statutes or
regulations for their merit system have gone beyond the Hatch
Act restrictions to restrict that the United States Civil Service
191. In re Lyle, 2 POL. AcT. Pm 413 (1951). See also cases cited
in note 112 supra.
192. See text accompanying note 112 supra.
193. See STATE EMPLOYEE PAMPHLET, supra note 27, at Contents Page.
194. See notes 207-17 infra and accompanying text.
195. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1970), relating to aid to families
with dependent children. Programs required to observe the standards
are indicated by statutory reference in 45 C.F.R. Part. 70 (1972) under
the heading "Authority." Twenty such references are given.
196. 45 C.F.R. §§ 70.1-.16 (1972).
197. Id. § 70.6.
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Commission would permit. 9"
The states' merit systems are not only responsible for draft-
ing their own restrictions, but also for enforcing them.'9 9 Thus
a second enforcement procedure exists. One important differ-
ence in the case of state enforcement is the penalties available.
The United States Civil Service Commission's ultimate weapon
is the withholding of federal funds for refusal to dismiss the em-
ployee involved. 20 0 The states, on the other hand, can suspend
or dismiss offenders. Such dual systems of enforcement present
questions of priority. Those responsible for the administration
of the standards have taken the position the state should wait
until the United States Civil Service Commission has acted. 20 1
VI. CONSTITUTIONALITY
The constitutionality of the Hatch Act and its application to
state and local employees were respectively upheld in 1947 by
the United States Supreme Court in the cases of United Public
Workers v. Mitchell,20 2 and Oklahoma v. United States Civil
Service Commission.20 3 In Mitchell an employee of the United
States Mint who had served as a ward executive committeeman,
an election day worker at the polls, and a party paymaster for
other election day workers, was charged with violating the
Hatch Act and was faced with dismissal from his job. The em-
ployee challenged the Commission's proceedings on the ground
that the Act was unconstitutional. He alleged that it abridged
his first amendment freedoms and the ninth and tenth amend-
ments, which reserve political rights to the people. Over two
sharp dissenting opinions by Justices Black and Douglas, the
Court upheld the Act. It said that
198. See, e.g., Mont. Merit System Rules, § 2, para. 3 (1971) (the
right to express one's opinion found in 5 U.S.C. § 1502(b) (1970) is quali-
fied by the word "privately"). See also testimony before Commission
on Political Activity of Governmental Personnel, 3 COMMISSION, supra
note 1, at 330.
199. 45 C.F.R. § 70.1 (b) (1972). Although establishment and mainte-
nance of the required standards is a condition to the receipt of federal
moneys, it is rare, if ever, that the federal government has withdrawn or
threatened to withdraw aid because of laxness in enforcing the standard
regarding political activity. See testimony of A. Aronson, Director of
Office of State Merit Systems, Dep't of H.E.W., 3 COMMISSION, supra
note 1, at 57.
200. See note 174 supra and accompanying text.
201. See testimony of Aronson, supra note 199, at 58.
202. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
203. 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
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Congress may regulate the political conduct of government em-
ployees "within reasonable limits," even though the regulation
trenches to some extent upon unfettered political action. The
determination of the extent to which political activities of gov-
ernmental employees shall be regulated lies primarily with Con-
gress. Courts will interfere only when such regulation passes
beyond the generally existing conception of governmental
power. That conception develops from practice, history, and
changing educational, social and economic conditions.20 4
Although with one exception the Mitchell decision has been
followed in all subsequent challenges to the Hatch Act,20 5 there
is good reason to doubt its vitality. First, the Mitchell Court's
approach in resolving the constitutionality issue has apparently
been abandoned. As the quoted language indicates, the Mitchell
decision used the reasonableness or rational nexus test to deter-
mine the validity of the Hatch Act. Great deference was paid to
Congressional judgment; any restriction on political activities
that could be justified with plausible arguments would presuma-
bly be valid.2 0 6 Since 1947 the Supreme Court has established a
policy of closely scrutinizing limitations on fundamental rights
204. 330 U.S. at 102.
205. Northern Va. Reg. Park Auth. v. United States, 437 F.2d 1346
(4th Cir.), cert denied, 403 U.S. 936 (1971); Palmer v. United States
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 297 F.2d 450 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 849
(1962); Fishkin v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 309 F. Supp. 40
(N.D. Calif. 1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 278 (1970); Gray v. Macy,
239 F. Supp. 658 (D. Ore. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 358 F.2d 742
(9th Cir. 1966); Engelhardt v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 197
F. Supp. 806 (M._D. Ala. 1961), aff'd per curiam, 304 F.2d 882 (5th Cir.
1962); see Democratic State Cent. Comm. v. Andolsek, 249 F. Supp.
1009, 1018-19 (D. Md. 1966) (expressly approving the use of the rational
basis test); cf. Kearney v. Macy, 409 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1969); Dingess v.
Hampton, 305 F. Supp. 169 (D.D.C. 1969). But see National Ass'n of
Letter Carriers v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 346 F. Supp. 578
(D.D.C.), prob. juris. noted, 93 S. Ct. 560 (1972) (purporting to be con-
sistent with the narrow holding in Mitchell while declaring part of the
Hatch Act unconstitutional). See discussion in text accompanying notes
32-33 supra and note 220 infra.
206. Another explanation for the Mitchell decision is that public em-
ployment is a privilege and as such it may be offered on such condi-
tions, including renunciation of constitutional rights, as the government
imposes. In fact, the Mitchell case is frequently cited as an example
of the right versus privilege distinction, and the majority opinion did
quote the hoary epigram of Mr. Justice, then Judge, Holmes, that "the
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has
no constitutional right to be a policeman." (McAuliffe v. Mayor of New
Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892), cited in 330 U.S. at 99
n.34.) Mitchell does not, however, develop this approach and in any
event it has been abandoned in recent years in public employment cases.
See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). For an ex-
cellent analysis of the area see Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-
Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439
(1968).
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such as those protected by the first amendment.20 7 Although
a precise formula for predicting the validity of restrictions on
first amendment rights is difficult to determine,2 0 8 such close
scrutiny usually involves two steps. First, the state is expected
to show that some compelling or significant state interest is
served by the restriction.20 9  Second, the state is expected to
show that the restriction in question constitutes less of a limita-
tion on fundamental liberties than alternative methods of pro-
tecting the compelling interests. 21 0  Restrictions that are vague
or broadly worded are usually considered to have a chilling ef-
fect on rights and thus have been held unconstitutional with
some regularity. 211
Aside from Mitchell and its progeny, there is no apparent
reason for not subjecting restrictions on political activity of pub-
lic employees to such close scrutiny. The Supreme Court has, in
the interim, recognized that voluntary political activity is a fun-
damental right protected by the first amendment. 212 The recent
case of National Association of Letter Carriers v. United States
Civil Service Commission21 3 has in fact utilized the newer ap-
proach to invalidate the definition of political activities contained
in that part of the Hatch Act relating to federal employees on
the ground that the incorporation by reference of 3,000 pre-1940,
unpublished civil service decisions in the definition was so vague
and overbroad as to have the impermissible chilling effect pro-
hibited by the first amendment. In addition, since 1964, nine
cases have closely scrutinized restrictions of state and local gov-
ernments on the political activities of their own employees and
found them unconstitutional, 21 4 each expressly rejecting the def-
207. See, e.g., Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
The old rational nexus or reasonableness test is still proper in judging
the constitutionality of measures regulating economic activity.
208. See Comment, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment,
78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969); Comment, Civil Disabilities and the First
Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 842 (1969).
209. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
210. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). For critical analysis of this step see
Comment, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, supra note
208.
211. See Comment, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine,
83 HARV. L. REv. 844 (1970).
212. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
213. 346 F. Supp. 578 (D.D.C. 1972), prob. juris. noted, 93 S. Ct. 560
(1972). See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
214. Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1971); Mancuso v.
Taft, 341 F. Supp. 574 (D.R.I. 1972); Gray v. Toledo, 323 F. Supp. 1281
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erential "reasonableness" approach of the Mitchell case. Other
cases have rejected the approach in the Mitchell case even
though they upheld restrictions.215 Although with the excep-
tion of the Letter Carriers case all of these cases carefully
avoided opining on the constitutionality of the Hatch Act itself,
and several courts took pains to show why the restrictions be-
fore them were more severe than the Hatch Act,21 the future of
the Act under this newer approach is far from certain. Even
two of the recent decisions upholding the Hatch Act and follow-
ing the Mitchell approach concede that the area is in a state of
:fl"[,X.2 1 7
Furthermore, the passage of time and developments in public
employment have undermined the validity of the assumptions
in the Mitchell case. As will be noted below, restrictions on po-
litical activity that were once popular and championed by the
civil service reform movement are falling into disfavor.-'I s The
need for these restrictions has been re-evaluated, and much less
(N.D. Ohio 1971); Huerta v. Flood, 103 Ariz. 608, 447 P.2d 866 (1968);
Bagley v. Washington Twp. Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409,
55 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966); Fort v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 331, 392
P.2d 385, 38 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1964); Kinnear v. San Francisco, 61 Cal.
2d 341, 392 P.2d 391, 38 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1964); De Stefano v. Wilson,
96 N.J. Super. 592, 233 A.2d 682 (Super. Ct. L. Div. 1967); Minielly v.
State, 242 Ore. 490, 411 P.2d 69 (1966); accord, Louthan v. Common-
wealth, 79 Va. 196 (1884); cf. Rosenfield v. Malcolm, 65 Cal. 2d 559, 421
P.2d 697, 55 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1967); Miami v. Sterbenz, 203 So. 2d 4 (Fla.
1967). For a discussion of this development see Shartsis, The Federal
Hatch Act and Related State Court Trends, 25 Bus. LAw. 1381 (1970).
215. Johnson v. State Civil Serv. Dep't, 280 Minn. 30, 157 N.W.2d 747
(1968). See Ivancie v. Thornton, 250 Ore. 550, 443 P.2d 612 (1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1018 (1969); cf. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 338 F. Supp. 711
(W.D. Okla.), prob. juris. noted, 93 S. Ct. 550 (1972). Four recent cases
have, however, upheld restrictions on the basis of the Mitchell decision.
See Wisconsin State Employees Ass'n v. Wisconsin Nat. Resources Bd.,
298 F. Supp. 339 (W.D. Wis. 1969); Crain v. Washington Parish Dem.
Exec. Comm., 252 So. 2d 752 (La. App. 1971); Lecci v. Looney, 33 App.
Div. 2d 916, 307 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1970); Salt Lake City Fire Fighters Local
1645 v. Salt Lake City, 22 Utah 2d 115, 449 P.2d 239, cert. denied, 395
U.S. 906 (1969). See also Lay v. Kingsport, 454 F.2d 345 (6th Cir.
1972) (upolding prohibition on dual office holding).
216. See Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1971); Mancuso
v. Taft, 341 F. Supp. 574 (D.IL 1972); Gray v. Toledo, 323 F. Supp. 1281
(N.D. Ohio 1971); Fort v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 331, 392 P.2d
385, 38 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1964).
217. Northern Va. Reg. Park Auth. v. United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 437 F.2d 1346 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 936 (1971); Fish-
kin v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 309 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Calif.
1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 278 (1970); cf. Democratic State Cent.
Comm. v. Andolsek, 249 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Md. 1966).
218. See text accompanying notes 234-39 infra.
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restrictive limitations are thought to be adequate. The result
may be that the reasonableness of restrictions today is not what
it was 25 years ago when Mitchell was decided.
Finally, the United States Supreme Court is apparently go-
ing to re-examine the Mitchell decision. It has agreed to hear
arguments in two recent cases, Broadrick v. Oklahoma2 10 and
National Association of Letter Carriers v. United States Civil
Service Commission..2 0  The Broadrick decision upheld state re-
strictions on political activities that are more confining than the
Hatch Act. The Letter Carriers decision, as noted, invalidated
the definition by reference in the Hatch Act. Although the
court that decided the Letter Carriers case carefully attempted
to demonstrate that its decision was not inconsistent with the
narrow holding in Mitchell, it did note the recent developments
in connection with state restrictions and the emergence of the
compelling interest test.
In view of the apparent pending Supreme Court decision in
the Broadrick and Letter Carriers cases, a comprehensive analy-
sis of the constitutionality issue is untimely and, in any case, has
been attempted elsewhere.22  Suffice it to say that the reason-
ableness test in Mitchell is inconsistent with the current state of
the law in the area, and the conclusion is out of step with condi-
tions in public employment. Most of the courts that have fol-
lowed it have done so out of devotion to stare decisis. Although
the Court could decide the Letter Carriers and Broadrick appeals
on grounds other than the merits or, in the Letter Carriers case,
on the extremely narrow grounds used by the district court,
hopefully it will take the opportunity to clarify what has come
to be an uncertain matter of constitutional law.
As noted previously, the companion case to Mitchell, Okla-
homa v. United States Civil Service Commission,222 upheld the
application of the Hatch Act restrictions to state and local em-
219. 338 F. Supp. 711 (W.D. Okla.), prob. juris. noted, 93 S. Ct.
550 (1972).
220. 346 F. Supp. 578 (D.D.C.), prob. juris. noted, 93 S. Ct. 550
(1972).
221. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, 582-92
(1970); Nelson, Public Employees and the Right to Engage in Political
Activities, 9 VAND. L. REv. 27 (1955); Comment, The Hatch Act-A
Constitutional Restraint of Freedom?, 33 ALBANY L. REV. 345 (1969);
Comment, The Public Employee and Political Activity, 3 SUFFOLK L. REV.
380 (1969); Note, 23 MERCER L. REv. 995 (1972); Note, 42 N.Y.U.L. RFv.
750 (1967); Note, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 736 (1970).
222. 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
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ployees working in connection with federally aided projects.
The Oklahoma decision did not assert that Congress could regu-
late such political activities directly; it only upheld the with-
holding of federal funds upon proof of defined activities. This
application of the Hatch Act has not been questioned since that
decision. In fact, with the great increase in federal grant pro-
grams the power of Congress to fix the terms on which federal
funds are granted has become axiomatic.223
VII. AN EVALUATION WITH SUGGESTIONS
At one time it seemed clear that restrictions on political
activity of public employees were appropriate. The civil service
reform movement considered such activity one of the evils of the
spoils system and machine politics that had to be severely lim-
ited for the efficiency and integrity of the service, the welfare of
the employees themselves, and the best interests of the political
process. 224 Politically active employees were more dedicated to
the parties that gave them the jobs than to the jobs themselves.
Promotions and assignments were apt to be based on political
efforts rather than merit. Employees might be forced to pay
political assessments 22 and work the precincts at election time.
In addition, that part of the public that depended upon govern-
ment services, contracts, or licenses was particularly susceptible
to exploitation by politically active government employees. Fi-
nally, a political organization manned by politicized "civil ser-
vants" does not promote openness in the political process or the
development of a strong two party system.2 20
The Hatch Act and other restrictions were drafted to cope
with these problems. It was decided that, to be effective, these
223. See, e.g., Arizona State Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Department of
HEW, 449 F.2d 456, 470 (9th Cir. 1971).
224. See 0. STAHL, PuBLic PERsoNmE AD MSTRATION 301 (6th ed.
1971). For an indication of the problems and the goals of the reformers
see C. Dunbar, Jr., Memorandum Explaining the Vital Necessity of
Provisions in a Civil Service Law of a Little "Hatch Act" (La. Civil
Serv. League, New Orleans, La. 1958); Catherwood, Political Activity
by Civil Service Employees, 7 ILL. L. REv. 160 (1912); Irwin, Public
Employees and the Hatch Act, 9 V&Nw. L. Rav. 527 (1956); Kaplan,
Political Neutrality of the Civil Service, 1 PUB. PM REV. 10 (1940).
The arguments in the rest of this paragraph are a summary of the
major points made by these and others who urged and justified the
Hatch Act and comparable state legislation.
225. For a thorough analysis of the public employee as a source of
party finances, see A. HEARD, THE CosTs OF DEmocRAcY 145-54 (1960).
226. See NATiONAL CrvnL SERvicE RFo m LEAGuE, THE AcTrvrrv oF
FsuxnAL OFFcFnorus iS N Potrrics 3 (Report of Special Comm. 1909).
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restrictions must be severe. In fact, the Hatch Act provisions
are broader than those of any comparable country in the western
world. 227 The prohibition against taking "an active part in po-
litical management and in political campaigns 228 eliminates vir-
tually all meaningful voluntary political activity. This breadth
also exists in the sense that the Act applies to employees regard-
less of the sensitivity of their positions. Manual laborers and
personnel administrators are subject to the same broad restric-
tions. Experience in Great Britain has shown that restrictions
which differentiate between employees on the basis of the sen-
sitivity of their positions are workable. 229  Finally, as noted
above, because state and local employees are confused by the
Hatch Act restrictions, they apparently refrain from engaging in
permitted activities because of an improper understanding of
the Act, giving the Act an even broader effect.2 "30
Although these restrictions protect the employee from po-
litical exploitation and perhaps promote the integrity and effi-
ciency of the public service and the interests of the political
process, they do so at a significant cost. The freedom of political
action taken for granted by the general public exists in only di-
luted form for the state and local employees subject to the Hatch
Act. This is a dehumanizing condition that tends to make the
public employee politically indifferent and less responsive to the
needs of society. For some prospective public employees, the
requirement of political celibacy may be too great a price to
pay.23 ' The result is that the civil service probably loses per-
sons who would make excellent public servants. The political
process also loses; it is denied the contribution that the restricted
employees could make. In view of the number of employees so
affected and the extent of their knowledge of and interest in
227. Only the Union of South Africa and Japan have equally severe
restrictions-Japan's apparently as a result of the United States occu-
pation. The Scandinavian countries have the least restrictive policies;
other European countries have minor restrictions. Although Canada
has comprehensive restrictions, it does grant public servants leaves of
absence to stand for election to legislative bodies. CAN. REV. STAT. C.
8-32, 32 (1970). See generally 2 CommissioN, supra note 1, at 158-71;
Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 222-24; MASSACHUSETTs LEISLATIVE RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL, REPORT RELATIVE TO POLITICAL AcTIVTIEs OF PUBLIC EM-
PLOYEES 25-30 (Dec. 21, 1964).
228. 5 U.S.C. § 1502(a) (3) (1970).
229. See Christoph, Political Rights and Administrative Impartiality
in the British Civil Service, 51 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 67 (1957).
230. See text accompanying notes 104-09 supra.
231. See testimony of H. Weisbroad, President, Nat'l Council of
Field Labor Lodges, AFL-CIO, in 3 CommIssioN, supra note 1, at 401.
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the problems of government, this loss is of no small signifi-
cance.
232
The emergence of a body of case law invalidating restrictions
on political activity as being too broad and too vague reflects
the growing feeling of courts that the need for the restrictions
is no longer sufficient to justify them.2 33 This feeling is in ac-
cord with the conclusions of those students of public adminis-
tration and others who have studied the problem.234 Patronage,
spoils, and machine politics are no longer the rule. With a few
exceptions, the public and the political process have accepted
the merit system of civil service.235
The National Civil Service League recognized these develop-
ments in its recently drafted Model Public Personnel Adminis-
tration Law.2 36  The previous Model Law severely restricted
political activity.237 The 1970 edition dramatically reduces the
scope of the restrictions, the introduction explaining that the
new law is designed for the "needs of the responsible ma-
jority. " 238  The comment on the section dealing with political
activity emphasizes the contribution the public employee can
make to the political process.2 30 Although not a model of clar-
ity, the new Model Law reflects a fundamental change in philos-
ophy.
232. Although the exact extent of the loss to the political process in
terms of public employee participation cannot be quantified, it appears
to be substantial Studies have found that approximately 30% of the
federal employees-more likely those with a better education-would
have participated in political activities but for the Hatch Act. A slightly
greater percentage of state and local employees surveyed were similarly
affected by the Hatch Act. See 2 CoMMissioN, supra note 1, at 18,
28-32, 77. There was, however, a split of opinion among state em-
ployees surveyed on whether a relaxation of the restrictions would
hinder the merit system. Id. at 78.
233. See cases cited in note 214 supra.
234. 0. STAHL, supra note 224, at 304-09; D. HAYMAN & 0. STAHL,
PoxxicAL AcTIvrY RESTRiCTIONS: AN ANALYsIs WrI REcoumu:NDATIONs(Public Personnel Ass'n Personnel Report No. 636, 1963); L. Loeb, Pub-
lic Empoyees and Political Activity: New Realities Require Fresh Ap-
proaches (1967), reprinted in 3 CoMMISsIoN, supra note 1, at 209. See
NATIONAL CIvI SERVICE LEAGUE, A MODEL PUBLIC PERsoNNEL ADMw-
isTRATIoN LAw 3, 12 (1970). Cf. 1 ConmISsioN, supra note 1, at 10-11
(see also pages 40-41 for Commission recommendations in this regard).
235. 0. STAHL, supra note 224, at 37-38. For a discussion of one of
the exceptions see testimony of Alderman Despres, Chairman, City
Council of Chicago, 3 CommissioN, supra note 1, at 468 et seq., indicat-
ing need for Hatch Act restrictions in Cook County, Illinois.
236. NATIONAL CIVn SERVICE LEAGUE, supra note 234, at § 7.
237. NATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE LEAGUE & NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE,
A MODEL STATE CIL SERVICE LAW § 19 (1953).
238. NATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE LEAGUE, supra note 234, at 3.
239. Id. § 7.
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Another development that affects the need for restrictions
on political activity is the growth of public employee labor
unions.240 At hearings held by the Commission on Political
Activity of Government Personnel and a Senate Committee, it
was repeatedly asserted that these organizations can be effective
checks on the exploitation of public employees for political pur-
poses and the spoils system.2 41  Although unions could align
themselves with political officials to exploit their members, there
is no indication that such abuses have occurred or would be a
serious problem.
As a result of the acceptance of the merit concept of public
employment, and the emergence of the public employee labor
movement, it seems clear that the broad, vague restrictions of
the Hatch Act have outlived their usefulness. The fact that the
Hatch Act constitutes a uniform federal restriction on more than
50 per cent 242 of the state and local employees not involved in ed-
ucation magnifies its undesirability. Public employees in areas
with well developed merit systems of public employment and
open political processes-areas where there is little need for re-
strictions on political activities-are compelled to adhere to feder-
al restrictions. In several such jurisdictions, the courts or legis-
latures have significantly reduced the scope of state and local re-
strictions. 243  In California, for example, state and local em-
ployees working in connection with federally assisted programs
are faced with the anomalous situation that state and local re-
strictions have, in highly publicized decisions, been held violative
of the United States Constitution, but the more restrictive pro-
visions of the Hatch Act are still in effect.244 State and local em-
240. Cohany & Dewey, Union Membership Among Gov't Employees,
9 MONTHLY LABOR BULL., July, 1970, at 15.
241. See 3 CoMMIssIoN, supra note 1, at 351, 456, 620, 735; Senate
Hearings, supra note 4, at 166, 196, 241. An excellent example of how
this works is a recent incident where subordinates were encouraged by
agency officials to purchase tickets to a fund raising dinner. Union pro-
tests of this solicitation led to action by the United States Civil Service
Commission against the officials in question. Id. at 88-137.
242. See note 4 supra.
243. For the judicial action see note 214 supra. Legislative
changes to less restrictive provisions have occurred recently in at least
five states. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 110.092 (Supp. 1972); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 365.29 (Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT. § 43.28 (1971); ORE. REV. STAT. § 260.
432 (1971); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 16.35 (1972). See also Mich. Civil Serv.
Rule 7 (Rev. of Mar. 8, 1971).
244. See generally testimony of W. Shea, Legal Adviser, League of
County Employees Ass'ns and of J. Slater, General Manager, Alameda
County Employees' Ass'n, 3 COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 613-28.
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ployees in all jurisdictions may find themselves in the confusing
situation that they are subject to different restrictions than
those imposed upon fellow employees performing similar func-
tions, the difference depending upon the absence or presence of
federal funds.
Finally, the appropriateness in our federal system of central
control of state and local personnel matters in general, and em-
ployee political activity in particular, is doubtful.245 Even
though Congress has a legitimate interest in seeing that its ap-
propriations are not used to build political empires, this interest
is subject to the interest of the state or its political subdivision,
as the actual employer, in the political activities of its employees.
Moreover, since it involves questions concerning participation in
the political process at even the state and local level, the subject
is sensitive and raises issues relating to the integrity and role of
the states in the federal system.2 40 In fact, one report concluded
that
the Hatch Act is probably the most unpopular Federal legislation
ever imposed on our State and local governments and their em-
ployees.247
It is the recommendation of the author that the federal gov-
ernment abandon this matter to the states. The danger of mis-
use of federal moneys for political purposes has been signifi-
cantly reduced in the 33 years since the Hatch Act was made
applicable to state and local employees.2 48 During that time the
245. For a brief discussion of the problem of appropriate federal re-
quirements in grant programs, see CoMIssION oN INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR TRANSMTTAL TO CONGRESS
[KEsTNBAUm REPORT] 136-39 (1955). It is worth noting that the applica-
tion of the Hatch Act to state and local employees is rigid. It has none of
the flexibility or co-operative federalism that apparently characterizes
federal-state relations. This difference is most obvious in the federal
standards for a merit system. Only the standard regarding political
activity is detailed. Compare 45 C.F.R. § 70.6 (1972) with §§ 70.3-.5,
70.7-.16. See generally D. ELAZAR, AmEicAN FEDERALiSM: A VIEw
FROM THE STATES 1-4, 161-63 (2d ed. 1972).
246. The application of the Hatch Act to the governor of a state
could present such questions. This is in fact possible. See text accom-
panying notes 154-56 supra. Arguably, the legal issues involved are
comparable to those raised by federal taxation of interest on indebted-
ness of state and local government.
247. H.R. Rm,. No. 2707, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1959). The Special
Committee to Investigate and Study the Operation and Enforcement of
the Hatch Political Activities Act that issued this report conducted an
opinion survey of state and local officials on the Act. The results, which
are overwhelmingly negative, are tabulated in P. FoRD, supra note 185,
at 44-47.
248. Id. at 42-43 and authorities cited in note 234 supra.
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states have shown concern with the political activities of their
employees by adopting provisions to limit abuses.2' 0  Although
some states have no effective laws or perhaps do not enforce the
laws they have,25 0 it is not clear that this gap is large enough to
justify continued federal concern with voluntary political activ-
ity of state and local employees. National uniformity with re-
spect to political activity of public employees is not a necessity.
It would be preferable to allow the lowest responsible level of
government to impose restrictions on its employees within con-
stitutional limits. If some federal legislation is necessary, pro-
hibition on abuse of official authority or position for political
purposes and on coercive solicitation should suffice.
Even if Congress determines that reliance on the states to
deal adequately with the excesses of political activities of their
employees is too bold a move, and that some significant federal
involvement must continue, basic changes should still be made.
Most importantly, the broad, vague limitations of the Hatch Act
must be replaced with legislation that generally recognizes the
right to participate in political activities subject to narrow, spe-
cific exceptions. It is suggested that only five such exceptions
would be appropriate: 251
1. Prohibit political activity during working hours, on premises
where employed or in uniform.
2. Prohibit use of official authority or influence for political
purposes such as inducing contributions, affecting personnel
decisions or encouraging subordinates to participate in po-
litical activity.
3. Prohibit political activity that constitutes a clear conflict of
interest with employment responsibilities.
4. Prohibit any solicitation of subordinate employees.
5. Require a leave of absence for candidates for a state or na-
tional office that would constitute a full-time position.
These restrictions are intended to prevent the employee's politi-
cal activity from being associated with or detracting from his
job. They are minimal and do not interfere with the employ-
ee's basic political rights. Since the third suggestion referring
to conflicts of interest is open-ended, it should be strictly lim-
249. See 2 CoMMIssIoN, supra note 1, at 92-104.
250. Id. at 103-04. With regard to enforcement, see discussion in P.
FORD, supra note 185, at 12-13. In any event, it is by no means clear
that the United States Civil Service Commission does an adequate job
of enforcing the Hatch Act. See note 185 supra and accompanying text.
251. Compare recommendations of D. HAYMAN & 0. STAHL, supra
note 234, at 17. More severe restrictions have been thought necessary for
policemen and firemen. Id. Compare Comment, The Policeman: Must
He Be a Second-Class Citizen with Regard to His First Amendment
Rights, 46 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 536 (1971).
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ited. It might also provide the basis for a code of ethics for pub-
lic employees in the area of political activities. Such a code
would not prohibit activities, but rather act as a guide to warn
when an activity is inappropriate. Violations of the third sug-
gestion or a code based upon it should not result in any punitive
action unless the violation constituted a flagrant conflict or if
it was persisted in after a body with responsibility for interpre-
ting the code had advised the employee he was in violation.
This approach is designed for those jurisdictions that have
avoided or overcome the need for severe restrictions on political
activity. To be sure, there are some jurisdictions which have
not reached that stage. The existence of such jurisdictions does
not, however, justify limitations on the political activities of all
state and local employees. Rather, it is suggested that if more
severe restrictions are thought necessary, they be applicable only
to the areas that need them and only to the extent needed to pro-
tect the interests of the public service, the civil servants and the
political process.2 52 Admittedly, such an approach is vague, re-
quires many decisions about what is appropriate, and thus might
be cumbersome as well as offensive in those areas singled out
for special treatment. This Article recommends it only as a
lesser evil than uniformly applicable severe restrictions. Since
guidelines have, in fact, been proposed to determine when re-
strictions on political activity are necessary and what those re-
strictions ought to be,253 administration of such a flexible ap-
proach is conceivable.
Two other problems remain if some significant federal in-
volvement is to continue. First, which state and local employees
should be subject to the federal restrictions? As has been seen,
the coverage provisions of the Hatch Act have been a source of
problems and, with the mushrooming of federal aid, the Hatch
Act restrictions are pre-empting the area. It is suggested that
the coverage provisions be changed in three respects:
1. Eliminate the qualification of "executive branch" in defining
local units of government whose employees are subject to
the Act. This simply recognizes the realities of government
organization at the local level.2 54
2. Except from coverage appointive state officials who hold
cabinet level positions. This has been an abrasive point
252. Compare the comments made by R. Brooks, Reg. Rep., Office
of State Merit Systems, Dept. HLE.W. See 3 CommissioN, supra note
1, at 693.
253. See D. MAYmAN & 0. STmL, supra note 234, at 16-19.
254. See text accompanying notes 134-35 supra.
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in the past and is a change that is widely recommended. 26
3. Limit coverage to state and local employees who work in
programs closely identified with the federal government.
Such programs would include those subject to the federal
standards for a merit system and would remove the am-
biguities of coverage that exist with the proliferation of re-
cently developed minor programs and with revenue sharing.
Since coverage is tied to federal funds, the problems with prin-
cipal employment are inevitable. In any event, the Civil Ser-
vice Commission appears to have achieved a working definition
of the concept.
The second problem is to determine what method should be
used for enforcing federal restrictions. Under the Hatch Act, the
United States Civil Service Commission has had this responsi-
bility while, under the federal standards for a merit system, the
states are responsible for enforcement. Such a division seems
unnecessary. It is suggested the states have enforcement re-
sponsibility.256 So long as their enforcement practices are ac-
ceptable, dual enforcement could be avoided.2 " Further, with
only minimal federal restrictions states could even incorporate
them in their own pattern of restrictions. Thus, dual sets of re-
strictions-one for all state or local employees and a second, and
usually more severe set, for those working in connection with
federally aided activities-could be avoided. If more severe re-
strictions are felt necessary for certain areas, they might have to
be enforced by a federal agency if the state or local govern-
mental entity proved to be incapable of enforcing them. Al-
though this delegation of enforcement to state and local govern-
ment and the encouragement to develop their own restrictions
would not promote uniformity or ease of administration at the
federal level, these disadvantages would be more than offset by
the uniformity of enforcement procedures within the state, by
the possibility of a single set of substantive restrictions within
the state, and by the step toward creative federalism that such a
delegation would represent.
255. See text accompanying notes 162-66 supra.
256. This is one of the recommendations of the Commission on
Political Activity of Government Personnel. See 1 COMMISSION, supra
note 1, at 29-30.
257. A collateral benefit of state enforcement would be the avail-
ability of a range of penalties that could be applied directly against
the offending employee. Under the Hatch Act, the ultimate weapon is
the withholding of funds from the employing agency. See text accom-
panying note 174 supra.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
As a result of the Hatch Act, several million state and local
employees have been made political eunuchs. It is the conclu-
sion of this Article that, irrespective of their constitutionality,
the Hatch Act restrictions are not necessary to prevent the mis-
use of federal funds or to protect the best interests of the public
service, state and local employees or the political process. Con-
gress ought to leave the problem of pernicious political activity
of state and local employees to the states. If, however, federal
involvement is to continue, the restrictions ought to be minimal
and enforcement responsibilities ought to be delegated to the
states.

